Law of Wills, 2016A

legislative direction to the contrary, neither logic nor justice supports the conclusion that a putative
spouse may inherit an intestate share of the decedent’s separate property but may not administer the
estate.
Here, the trial court denied Garvin’s petition for letters of administration. As a putative husband,
Garvin is a surviving spouse under section 422. Therefore, he is entitled to letters of administration
and has preference over anyone else. The trial court’s ruling was in error.
IV.
Next, Garvin contends that the trial court erred in finding that certain of the Desert Hot Springs
property, the Mira Loma furniture, and the trustee bank account were decedent’s separate property.
He also contends that the trial court erred in failing to find a community interest in the
improvements made to decedent’s restaurant property. His argument is essentially that the trial
court’s determinations are unsupported by substantial evidence.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court is guided by well-settled principles. “[T]he
power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the trial court’s findings. (Crawford
v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal. 2d 427, 429, 45 P.2d 183; Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal. 3d
639, 660, 190 Cal. Rptr. 355, 660 P.2d 813). “We must therefore view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, giving [him] the benefit of every reasonable inference and
resolving all conflicts in [his] favor ....” (Ibid.) “ ‘The finding of a trial court that property is either
separate or community in character is binding and conclusive on the appellate court if it is supported
by sufficient evidence, or if it is based on conflicting evidence or upon evidence that is subject to
different inferences ....’ ” (Beam v. Bank of America (1971) 6 Cal.3d 12, 25, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137, 490 P.2d
257). With these familiar principles in mind, this court examines each of the challenged findings.
Three parcels of real property were purchased during the putative marriage. Although two parcels
were purchased at the same time, title to each was taken in a different manner. Title to Parcel 1 was
taken in Leslie’s and Garvin’s names as joint tenants, while title to Parcel 2 was taken in Leslie’s
name alone. Sixteen months later, Garvin and Leslie purchased Parcel 3. Title to it was taken in both
their names as tenants in common.
Garvin contests the trial court’s findings that Parcel 2 and Leslie’s one-half interest in Parcel 3 were
her separate property. However, the record amply supports those findings.
The fact that title to each of the three parcels was taken in a different manner, particularly where all
were purchased within a 16-month period, supports the inference that the parties deliberately
intended to differentiate the ownership interests in each. Garvin’s own testimony supports this
inference. As he testified, a married couple “could put land or buy land in one name or another,
whatever they wanted to. I mean, that was up to their own particular rights. Each of us knew how
[title] got there and why. Of course, we never anticipated all these other problems at this point in
time.” Garvin was obviously sophisticated enough to understand the reasons for taking title to the
properties in different ways. Thus, the trial court’s findings that Parcel 2 and one-half of Parcel 3
were decedent’s separate property were amply justified.
Garvin’s contention that the trial court erred in finding that the bulk of Leslie’s furniture was her
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