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Law of Wills, 2016A

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15.4 Ademption<br />

The law considers a devise in a will to be an expectancy, so does the testator. If a person<br />

executes a will leaving his or her property to someone, that person does not expect the devisee to<br />

get any interest in that property until after he or she dies. After a person executes a will, he or she<br />

continues to act as the owner or the property. Consequently, due to life circumstances, the person<br />

may not own the devised property when the will becomes operational. For example, a person may<br />

lose a house to foreclosure, sell a car or have a piece <strong>of</strong> jewelry stolen. In addition a person may<br />

distributed some <strong>of</strong> the property mentioned in the will to the devisee. The doctrine <strong>of</strong> ademption<br />

applies to situations involving changes in property following the execution <strong>of</strong> a will. There are two<br />

types or ademption---extinction and satisfaction.<br />

15.4.1 Ademption by Extinction<br />

Specific devises <strong>of</strong> real and personal property are subject to the doctrine <strong>of</strong> ademption by<br />

extinction. This rule only applies to specific devises. A specific devise refers to a piece <strong>of</strong> property<br />

that is explicitly named like a house or a mink coat. Hence, if T leaves a will stating, “I leave my<br />

1998 black mustang to Joe,” Joe only gets the mustang if T dies owning the car. Under the doctrine<br />

<strong>of</strong> ademption by extinction, if T sells the mustang, Joe is not entitled to receive the value <strong>of</strong> the<br />

mustang or another car that T owns at the time <strong>of</strong> his or her death. General, demonstrative, and<br />

residuary devises are not impacted by the rule <strong>of</strong> ademption. If the testator intends to confer a<br />

general benefit on the devisee instead <strong>of</strong> leaving him or her a particular piece <strong>of</strong> property, the devise<br />

is classified as general. For example, T executes a will stating, “I leave $50,000 to Tina.” If T does<br />

not have $50,000 in cash when he or she dies, the executor <strong>of</strong> the estate must sell other property to<br />

satisfy the legacy meant for Tina. A demonstrative devise refers to a general gift to be paid from a<br />

specific source. For instance, T executes a will stating, “I leave $50,000 to Troy to be paid from the<br />

sale <strong>of</strong> my Wells Fargo stock.” If T dies without owning $50,000 worth <strong>of</strong> Wells Fargo stock, Troy<br />

does not lose his devise. The executor must sell other property to raise the $50,000 so Troy can be<br />

paid. The residuary devise is a grant <strong>of</strong> the remainder <strong>of</strong> the estate. This devise is not adeemed<br />

because the devisee takes whatever is left over after all <strong>of</strong> the other devises have been satisfied.<br />

Stewart v. Sewell, 215 S.W.3d 815 (Tenn. 2007)<br />

CORNELIA, J.<br />

We granted this appeal to clarify the applicability <strong>of</strong> the rule <strong>of</strong> ademption by extinction and <strong>of</strong><br />

Tennessee Code Annotated section 32-3-111 concerning the sale <strong>of</strong> specifically devised property. In<br />

August 1994, the decedent Clara Stewart executed her last will and testament in which she left a<br />

parcel <strong>of</strong> real estate to her stepson, the plaintiff in this matter. In November 1994, the decedent<br />

executed a durable power <strong>of</strong> attorney to her natural children, defendants Sewell and Judkins. In<br />

January 1997, the decedent’s health had so far deteriorated that she required placement in a nursing<br />

home. In February 1997, Sewell and Judkins sold a portion <strong>of</strong> the devised real estate in order to fund<br />

the decedent’s nursing home expenses. After their mother’s death, Sewell and Judkins inherited the<br />

remaining proceeds <strong>of</strong> the sale; the plaintiff inherited that portion <strong>of</strong> the real estate which had not<br />

665

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