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Law of Wills, 2016A

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her will. On our de novo review, we find clear evidence that Marguerite intended the 1996 payments<br />

to be in satisfaction <strong>of</strong> the bequests she made in her will. We find the factual differences ascribed to<br />

the cases concerning the doctrine <strong>of</strong> satisfaction by the district court do not overcome the<br />

application <strong>of</strong> that doctrine to the facts in this case.<br />

Based on the doctrine <strong>of</strong> satisfaction, we reverse that portion <strong>of</strong> the district court opinion which<br />

determined Mary was entitled to $10,000 from the estate. The bequest <strong>of</strong> $5,000 to Mary has been<br />

satisfied. Mary is still entitled to receive the $5,000 which represented the share <strong>of</strong> her brother,<br />

Charles, because this bequest has not been satisfied.<br />

V. Final Report<br />

The executor argues that the district court should have approved the final report. Based on our<br />

conclusions above, we determine the final report correctly provided, “it appears that the devisees<br />

and beneficiaries shown in the Last Will & Testament have received their share <strong>of</strong> the bequest that<br />

was provided in the Last Will & Testament when the decedent made an advance payment in<br />

1996....” The final report notes that Mary is still entitled to $5,000, which represents the share <strong>of</strong><br />

Charles. We conclude the final report should be approved.<br />

VI. Other Issues<br />

Mary has raised some procedural issues regarding this appeal. The supreme court considered these<br />

issues in considering Mary’s motion to dismiss, and denied the motion. We conclude these issues<br />

have already been addressed and we do not consider them further.<br />

We reverse the decision <strong>of</strong> the district court and remand for an order approving the final report.<br />

Reversed and remanded.<br />

In order to rebut the presumption <strong>of</strong> satisfaction, the devisee has to show that the testator<br />

did not intend for the lifetime gift to be a substitution for the devise in the will. It is usually difficult<br />

for the court to ascertain the testator’s intent. Consequently some state legislators have enacted<br />

statutes requiring that the testator’s intent to adeem a gift by satisfaction be in writing. These<br />

jurisdictions appear to have created a presumption that the gift has not be adeemed.<br />

SDCL § 29A-2-609. Ademption by satisfaction (S.D.)<br />

(a) Property a testator gave during lifetime to a person is treated as a satisfaction <strong>of</strong> a devise in whole<br />

or in part, only if (i) the will provides for deduction <strong>of</strong> the gift, (ii) the testator declared in a writing<br />

that the gift is in satisfaction <strong>of</strong> the devise or that its value is to be deducted from the value <strong>of</strong> the<br />

devise, or (iii) the devisee acknowledged in writing that the gift is in satisfaction <strong>of</strong> the devise or that<br />

its value is to be deducted from the value <strong>of</strong> the devise.<br />

(b) For purposes <strong>of</strong> partial satisfaction, property given during lifetime is valued as <strong>of</strong> the time the<br />

devisee came into possession or enjoyment <strong>of</strong> the property or at the testator's death, whichever<br />

occurs first.<br />

680

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