Law of Wills, 2016A

Similarly, because no other state slayer statute contains a provision similar to subsection (k), out-ofjurisdiction
case law provides no ready assistance. However, the Alaska Court of Appeals has
interpreted this phrase in another, similar context. In criminal presumptive sentencing, the legislature
enacted a “safety valve” provision that permits review of a sentence by a special three-judge panel
upon a showing of manifest injustice. In Smith v. State, the court of appeals equated manifest
injustice with that which is “plainly unfair.” Later, in Beltz v. State the court of appeals held that a
presumptive term cannot be manifestly unjust “in general” but only “as applied to a particular
defendant.” Before finding manifest injustice, the court held that the “judge must articulate specific
circumstances that make the defendant significantly different from a typical offender within that
category or that make the defendant’s conduct significantly different from a typical offense.” We
adopt Beltz’s approach for the purpose of applying subsection (k) of Alaska’s slayer statute.
Thus, the relevant comparison here is between Blodgett’s conduct and that of a typical offender
convicted of negligent homicide. In the criminal proceedings, Blodgett was sentenced to three and
one-half years in prison. This sentence approaches the presumptive term for second felony offenses,
suggesting that the superior court did not believe Blodgett’s acts fell at the lowest level of culpability
for a negligent homicide. Given the length of the sentence, we are reassured that the court below
considered Blodgett’s conduct in relation to other similarly situated defendants when it rejected
Blodgett’s claim of manifest injustice.
Blodgett attempted to prove that enforcement of the slayer statute would result in manifest injustice
by introducing evidence regarding (1) past family relationships, and (2) possible impecunity if denied
the benefits of inheritance. The court found that Blodgett failed to meet his burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, extraordinary circumstances that would have made it manifestly
unjust to exclude him from his father’s will. We agree.
The court described the evidence regarding family relationships as “unhelpful.” While the court’s
statement that the “nature and quality of the relationship between these parties during life seem
unrelated to the fairness of allowing the killer to benefit after the decedent’s death” may be a narrow
interpretation of the relevance of past relationships generally, we do not believe it was an abuse of
discretion under the circumstances of this case. Witnesses testified that Blodgett and his father
shared a relationship of “tough love,” a “good relationship” marked with occasional “squabblings”
typical of father-son relationships. Such testimony neither proves nor refutes the fairness of
forfeiting Blodgett’s inheritance. The court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Blodgett
failed to prove manifest injustice on this ground.
The court also examined Blodgett’s argument that “it would be unjust to deny benefits under the
will to someone who is physically disabled, who faces unknowable future medical expenses, who has
a compromised earning capacity and has ongoing psychological needs.” The superior court noted
that, although Blodgett suffered some medical disabilities, Blodgett’s own witness testified that he
“is adept at the operation of heavy equipment and has skills as a mechanic.” The court found that
these skills could lead to employment with yearly compensation ranging between $40,000 and
$50,000 per year. It also found that Blodgett owns other property and that future medical expenses
will likely be met through the Alaska Native Health Service. In light of this testimony, the court
concluded that Blodgett “would not be beggared if he did not receive these funds.” Consequently,
the court found that Blodgett failed to prove manifest injustice based on monetary need.
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