Law of Wills, 2016A

when it appears thereby that the decedent’s purpose was to make a posthumous gift. On this point
the court below well said:
‘Deeds, mortgages, letters, powers of attorney, agreements, checks, notes, etc., have all been held to
be, in legal effect, wills. Hence, an assignment (Coulter v. Shelmadine, 204 Pa. 120, 53 Atl. 638), *** a
deed (Turner v. Scott, 51 Pa. 126), a letter of instructions (Scott’s Estate, 147 Pa. 89, 23 Atl. 212, 30
Am. St. Rep. 713), a power of attorney (Rose v. Quick, 30 Pa. 225), and an informal letter of requests
(Knox’s Estate, 131 Pa. 220, 18 Atl. 1021, 6 L.R.A. 353, 17 Am. St. Rep. 798), were all held as wills.’
It is equally clear that where, as here, the words ‘if enny thing hapens,’ condition the gift, they
strongly support the idea of a testamentary intent; indeed they exactly state what is expressed in or
must be implied from every will. True, if the particular contingency stated in a paper, as the
condition upon which it shall become effective, has never in fact occurred, it will not be admitted to
probate. Morrow’s Appeal, 116 Pa. 440, 9 Atl. 660, 2 Am. St. Rep. 616; Forquer’s Estate, 216 Pa. 331, 66
Atl. 92, 8 Ann. Cas. 1146. In the present case, however, it is clear the contingency, ‘if enny thing
hapens,’ was still existing when testator died suddenly on the same day he wrote and mailed the
letter; hence, the facts not being disputed, the question of testamentary intent was one of law for the
court. Davis’ Estate, 275 Pa. 126, 118 Atl. 645.
As is often the case in holographic wills of an informal character, much of that which is written is
not dispositive; and the difficulty, in ascertaining the writer’s intent, arises largely from the fact that
he had little, if any, knowledge of either law, punctuation, or grammar. In the present case this is
apparent from the paper itself; and in this light the language now quoted must be construed:
‘I think we are gone to have one of the hardest [winters]. Plenty of snow & Verry cold Verry cold! I
dont want to see it this way but it will come * * * well I cant say if I will come over yet. I will wright
in my next letter it may be to ruff we will see in the next letter if I come I have some very valuable
papers I want you to keep fore me so if enny thing hapens all * * * [the real and personal property
specified] goes to George Darl and Irvin Kepp this letter lock it up it may help you out.’
When resolved into plainer English, it is clear to us that all of the quotation, preceding the words ‘I
have some very valuable papers,’ relate to the predicted bad weather, a doubt as to whether decedent
will be able to go to Glencoe because of it, and a possible resolution of it in his next letter; the
present one stating ‘we will see in the next letter if I come.’ This being so, the clause relating to the
valuable papers begins a new subject of thought, and since the clearly dispositive gifts which follow
are made dependent on no other contingency than ‘if enny thing happens,’ and death did happen
suddenly on the same day, the paper, so far as respects those gifts, must be treated as testamentary.
It is difficult to understand how the decedent, probably expecting an early demise-as appears by the
letter itself, and the fact of his sickness and inability to work, during the last three days of the first or
second week preceding-could have possibly meant anything else than a testamentary gift, when he
said ‘so if enny thing hapens [the property specified] goes to George Darl and Irvin’; and why, if this
was not intended to be effective in and of itself, he should have sent it to two of the distributees
named in it, telling them to ‘Kepp this letter lock it up it may help you out.’
The second question to be determined depends on the proper construction of section 2 of the Wills
Act of June 7, 1917 (P. L. 403, 405; Pa. St. 1920, § 8308), which is a re-enactment of section 6 of the
Wills Act of April 8, 1833 (P. L. 249), reading as follows:
535