Law of Wills, 2016A

him even a small sum with intent to discharge the legacy or to substitute the
advancement for the bequest, the legacy is satisfied, or, as it is sometimes said,
adeemed. When the amount of the advancement or gift is smaller than the
legacy, the satisfaction is held complete, not for the reason that the smaller sum
is regarded as payment of the larger, but by reason of the intent of the testator to
substitute the smaller for the larger, and to reduce the amount of the general
legacy. The doctrine of satisfaction depends very largely, if not altogether, upon
the intent of the testator.
In re Estate of Brown, 139 Iowa 219, 225-26, 117 N.W. 260, 262-63 (1908).
“[A]pplication of the doctrine of satisfaction of legacies ultimately depends upon evidence of the
decedent’s intent at the time the lifetime gift is made.” 1 Sheldon F. Kurtz, Kurtz on Iowa Estates §
15.26, at 615 (3d ed.1995). See also 13 Julie L. Pulkrabek & Gary J. Schmit, Iowa Practice-Probate §
11:115, at 422 (2005) (“Whether a payment made by testator to a legatee after the making of the will
amounted to a satisfaction of the legacy depends upon the intent of the testator in making the
payment .”). The doctrine of satisfaction depends upon the intention of the testator, as inferred
from his or her acts. Keeler, 225 Iowa at 1354, 282 N.W. at 365.
It is not essential that the decedent’s will specifically provides for satisfaction based on inter vivos
gifts. Rodgers, 205 Iowa at 1317, 217 N.W. at 444. The court should consider all the facts and
surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the testator. Id. at 1317-18, 217 N.W. at 444. A
party may show through extrinsic evidence that the testator intended a payment to be considered as
satisfaction for a bequest. In re Estate of Youngerman, 136 Iowa 488, 492, 114 N.W. 7, 9 (1907).
“Since proof of a decedent’s intent is frequently difficult, the Iowa courts have adhered to two
presumptions in applying the doctrine.” Kurtz on Iowa Estates § 15.26, at 615. In the first instance,
when the testator is a parent or stands in loco parentis to the legatee, a subsequent gift to the legatee
is presumed to be in satisfaction of the legacy. Heileman, 211 Iowa at 345, 233 N.W. at 543.
On the other hand, where the testator is a stranger to the legatee, such a presumption does not arise.
Youngerman, 136 Iowa at 492-93, 114 N.W. at 9. A party may still show that satisfaction was intended,
however, by clear proof that satisfaction was intended. Id. at 493, 114 N.W. at 9; 97 C.J.S. Wills, §
1767, at 470 (2001) (noting that where a presumption does not arise, “the burden is on the one
claiming that the testator intended a satisfaction of the legacy to prove such intention, and the
evidence must be clear and convincing”). The intention to satisfy a legacy may be shown if the
benefit subsequently conveyed is the same or so far identical in character as to be ejusdem generis.
Youngerman, 136 Iowa at 493, 114 N.W. at 9; Iowa Practice-Probate, § 11:115, at 423. The intention has
also been shown where there was a receipt attached to the will showing satisfaction of the legacy. See
Heileman, 211 Iowa at 347-48, 233 N.W. at 544.
Since Marguerite and Mary did not have a parent-child relationship, there is no presumption that
Marguerite intended the 1996 payment to be a satisfaction of the legacy in her will. We consider all
the facts and surrounding circumstances to determine Marguerite’s intent. See Rodgers, 205 Iowa at
1317, 217 N.W. at 444.The executor may show, through extrinsic evidence, that Marguerite intended
to satisfy the legacy. See Youngerman, 136 Iowa at 493, 114 N.W. at 9.On this issue we consider the
notation of “will payment” on the checks and Robert’s testimony as to Marguerite’s intent. We also
note that the payments made by Marguerite were for the precise amount of the specific bequests in
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