Law of Wills, 2016A

parent's constitutional right to privacy). Contracts purporting to grant visitation rights to nonparents
are unenforceable. Taylor v. Kennedy, 649 So.2d 270, 271-72 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“Florida courts do
not recognize a claim for specific performance of a contract for visitation in favor of a nonparent.”).
Therefore, pursuant to the contract's severability clause, we sever the unenforceable
portion of the contract purporting to give visitation rights to Mr. Lucas.
The sperm donor here has no legal parental rights, and this case should have been dismissed after
our prior opinion. Accordingly, we reverse the supplemental final judgment and remand to the trial
court for the entry of a final judgment declaring that Mr. Lucas has no enforceable parental rights.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Questions
1. Should known sperm donors be treated differently from anonymous sperm donors? Why? Why
not?
2. Should the sperm donor be treated as if he has no parental rights? Should the court recognize the
sperm donor’s parental rights and force him to waive them?
3. If a single woman is inseminated with donor sperm, should the donor have a duty to support the
child if something happens to the woman when the child is under the age of majority? In order to
prevent the child from becoming an orphan, should a single woman be required to appoint a
guardian for the child prior to being artificially inseminated?
6.5.2 The Sperm Donor May Be the Legal Father
Shultz v. Shultz, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super Ct. 2007)
KELLY, J.
These unconsolidated appeals lie from two orders, denying respectively Appellant's complaint,
lodged in York County, for sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties' four children, and
her motion to join the biological father of two of the children in Dauphin County proceedings to
resolve Appellee's complaint for child support. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part, and
hold that, in the circumstances of this case, the doctrine of equitable estoppel governs the financial
obligation of a sperm donor to support children in whose lives he is involved.
Beginning in 1996, the parties lived together in York County for approximately nine years, during
which period they underwent a commitment ceremony in Pittsburgh, and entered into a civil union
in Vermont. Of the children who are the subjects of these actions, two, A.J. and L.J., are nephews of
Appellee's whom she has adopted. The remaining two, Co.J. and Ca.J., are Appellee's biological
children by Appellee Carl Frampton, a long-time friend of Appellant's. At her instigation he agreed
to act as sperm donor, and has been involved in the children's lives since their birth.
In February of 2006, after several months during which the parties continued to reside together
despite separation as a couple, Appellee relocated with the children from York County to Dauphin
299