Law of Wills, 2016A

questions of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.
We first determine which statutes govern the legal effect of the termination proceeding. Kovacs and
the State urge us to apply current dependency and adoption statutes because the probate statutes
that apply are those in effect at the time of the decedent’s death, and the intestacy statutes vest heirs
with legal interests only upon the death of their intestate ancestor. Marzan agrees that modern
probate statutes apply, but argues that the termination proceeding is a separate matter that must be
considered under the 1947 statutes. We hold that the legal effect of the 1947 termination order must
be analyzed under the statutes in force at the time of the termination proceeding, not under those in
effect at the time of Thomas’s death in 1996. The 1947 parental termination order was issued under
Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1700, which governed surrender of a child to a charitable society for the purposes
of receiving, caring for, or placing the child out for adoption. Therefore, we consider the
termination order in light of that statute, and we need not address the arguments advanced by
Kovacs and the State regarding the application of modern adoption and termination statutes to this
case.
We next determine whether the 1947 statute and termination order operated to permanently divest
Margaret Fleming of her right to intestate inheritance from her biological son Thomas.
Under Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1700, when a child is surrendered to the care and custody of a benevolent
or charitable incorporated society for the purpose of receiving, caring for, or placing the child out
for adoption, then, (but not otherwise), the rights of its natural parents or of the guardian of its
person (if any) shall cease and such corporation shall become entitled to the custody of such child,
and shall have authority to care for and educate such child or place it either temporarily or
permanently in a suitable private home in such manner as shall best secure its welfare.
The 1947 order approved Margaret Fleming’s voluntary relinquishment “of all of her maternal rights
and interests in and to the said child,” ordered that Margaret Fleming “is hereby permanently
deprived of any and all maternal rights and interests in and to the said Baby Boy Fleming,” and
committed Thomas to the permanent custody of the Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Seattle.
Margaret Fleming chose to surrender Thomas to a charitable society under Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1700.
By the express language of that statute and the termination order, Margaret Fleming was
permanently deprived of all maternal rights and interests in Thomas. The statute and order need not
expressly provide that termination of parental rights terminates intestate succession, because “all
maternal rights and interests” clearly includes intestate inheritance rights.
According to Marzan, Fleming’s intestate inheritance rights were not extinguished because a series
of early Washington Supreme Court cases hold that the rights of any kin to inherit in intestacy from
each other cannot be extinguished absent express legislative declaration. Because the Legislature has
never expressly stated that termination of parental rights simultaneously cuts off intestate inheritance
rights, Marzan argues that only a decree of adoption can have this effect. Marzan’s overly broad
reading of these cases is incorrect. The statutes addressed in those cases were silent as to the right of
adopted children to inherit in intestacy from their biological parents. However, as noted, the statute
and the order issued pursuant to it in this case deprived the natural parent of all rights regarding the
child. The cases relied on by Marzan tracked the statutes then in effect when they held that the
Legislature had not expressly terminated the intestate inheritance rights of a child from its biological
parents. But the cases did not address the reverse issue presented here.
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