Law of Wills, 2016A

law, viz., the meaning of the provision in question. (E.g., 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8
Cal.4th 216, 271, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 807, 878 P.2d 566.) It survives scrutiny. The analysis set out above
establishes the point. Petitioner argues to the contrary. At bottom, she relies on Stevenson. But
Stevenson has been found wanting. She also relies on the comment, quoted above, that one of the
legal barriers to adoption exists “where ... a parent of the” “foster child or stepchild” “refuses to
consent to the adoption.” (Senate Committee on Judiciary Report, supra, Sen. J. (1983-1984 Reg.
Sess.) p. 4882.) But that comment deals only with what such a barrier is, and not when it has to exist
or how long it has to continue. In addition, she asserts that, in order to give the provision's
“continuing relationship” and “legal barrier” requirements independent meaning, we should
understand the former to be temporal but not causal and the latter to be causal but not temporal.
We cannot do so. What is temporal need not be causal. But what is causal must be temporal: A
cause exists only when it operates; it operates only when it is effective; it is effective only when it fills
at least one moment in time. Even though we cannot understand the provision's requirements as
urged, we can nevertheless give them independent meaning: The former assures that a relationship
between the foster parent or stepparent and the foster child or stepchild lasted until death, and the
latter assures that that relationship was tantamount to that of adoption.
The Court of Appeal was also right as to the probate court's express finding that petitioner failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that decedent would have adopted her but for a legal
barrier. Such a finding is reviewed for substantial evidence: It resolves a mixed question of law and
fact that is nonetheless predominantly one of fact, inasmuch as it “requires application of experience
with human affairs....” (Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881,
888, 264 Cal.Rptr. 139, 782 P.2d 278.) It survives scrutiny. Petitioner does not argue to the contrary.
Under Probate Code section 6454, a legal barrier to adoption must have continued until death. But
she admitted below that such a barrier did not perdure. She makes the same admission here.
Lastly, we observe that, to the extent that the purpose of Probate Code section 6454 is to pass the
estate of an intestate decedent in accordance with the “intent” that he “is most likely to have had” at
the time of death, and to do so in an “efficient and expeditious” manner (Tent. Recommendation
Relating to Wills and Intestate Succession, supra, 16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, at p. 2319),
it appears to be satisfied in this case. As the probate court stated, “it is not an insignificant fact that,”
in his old will, decedent “did not express any testamentary intent toward” petitioner “as a successor
beneficiary should, as actually happened, his wife have predeceased him.” This fact, of course, is not
proof. But it is all there is. And it is not challenged.
IV
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that we must affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeal.
It is so ordered.
CHIN, Associate Justice, dissenting.
In this case, we must apply Probate Code section 6454, which provides in relevant part: “For the
purpose of determining intestate succession by a person ... from or through a foster parent or
stepparent, the relationship of parent and child exists between that person and the person's foster
parent or stepparent if both of the following requirements are satisfied: (a) The relationship began
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