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Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering

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8<br />

Unlimited-Aircraft<br />

<strong>Tactics</strong><br />

Of course, with the increasing number of aeroplanes one gets increased<br />

opportunities for shooting down one's enemies, but at the same time, the<br />

opportunity increases of being shot down one's-self.<br />

Baron Manfred von Richthofen<br />

In previous chapters there has been at least an implied assumption that<br />

the number of hostile fighters involved in the action was known to the<br />

friendly forces, although frequent references have been made to additional,<br />

unseen, wild-card bogeys. Assumptions such as this are necessary in order<br />

to allow investigation of some of the fine points of ACM; but anyone who<br />

has ever been involved in actual combat will realize that total confidence<br />

in one's perception of a given situation is rarely, if ever, achieved. The great<br />

Prussian strategist Karl von Clausewitz referred to this phenomenon as the<br />

"fog of war," a fog that obscures reality from the combatants. In the<br />

air-to-air arena this can mean imperfect knowledge of an opponent's energy<br />

state, or uncertainty as to the type of weapons or tactics he might<br />

employ. It can also mean that friendly fighters can almost never be absolutely<br />

sure of the number of enemy aircraft they will face, either prior to or<br />

during engagement. Is that enemy section really alone/ or is the entire<br />

enemy air force lurking undetected in the sun?<br />

Any soldier knows that during a war it is not always the ponderables that<br />

count, but that a great deal depends on luck.<br />

Lt. General Adolph Gall<strong>and</strong>, Luftwaffe<br />

Obviously, if the friendly fighters always chose to assume the worst<br />

case, they probably would never engage <strong>and</strong> therefore be of little use. So the<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ard procedure adopted by most combatants is to gather <strong>and</strong> analyze<br />

all the information available about the tactical situation from every possible<br />

source, <strong>and</strong> then employ tactics accordingly. In the early days of air<br />

warfare, knowledge was limited to that supplied by intelligence reports on<br />

the numbers <strong>and</strong> types of enemy aircraft <strong>and</strong> ground defenses in the area,

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