Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States

tenegro. The Serbian Orthodox Church may sooner or later demand from
the Croatian government the construction of the old project of the “Temple
of the Atonement” at Jasenovac. The Serbian Church is likely to request
from the Macedonian government in Skopje the rebuilding of memorials at
World War I battlefields in Macedonia, not to mention the renovation and
better care of Macedonian monasteries built by the Serbian medieval kings.
Of the Albanian authorities in Kosovo, the Serbian Church will be asking
permission to rebuild the Djakovica cathedral and other destroyed churches
and monasteries, along with numerous projects concerning the renovation
and maintenance of the Serbian sacred heritage in Kosovo. If Kosovo is
granted statehood, the Serb myth will be only reinvigorated. The major slogan
of Serbian right-wing politics will be “We shall return.” And as long as
the shrines built by medieval Serb kings stand, this return, in the form of
apparently peaceful, devout pilgrims or armed soldiers in tanks, must not
be ruled out. If the shrines are destroyed, the Serbs will return to rebuild
them. Kosovo will remain “Serbian Jerusalem.” The news that a moderate
Albanian party has won the November 2001 Kosovo elections should not
be considered very good news, because all Albanian parties demand the fullfledged
statehood and independence of Kosovo, thus playing into the hands
of Serb nationalists. There is no politics or economy that can insulate Kosovo
Albanians from the power of the Kosovo myth and cast a shadow over the
Christian shrines of “Serbian Jerusalem.” The Albanians may have statehood,
but the Serbs have the shrines and the Albanians don’t. Albanian
statehood in Kosovo is about politics and the economy. “Serbian Jerusalem”
is about what Mircea Eliade, drawing from Nietzsche, termed the Myth of
the Eternal Return. In a nutshell, Kosovo will remain the fountainhead of
Serbian nationalism. There will be always someone in Belgrade calling on
the Serbs to do something similar to Israel’s 1967 reconquest of Jerusalem.
These “eternal returns,” symbolic or material, are likely to continue in Kosovo
and elsewhere in the region. The may surface as cultural movements,
with commemorations, pilgrimages, lamentations, nostalgia, and traditional
motives in literature, film, music, art, and religion but no dramatic political
implications. They also may evolve into political movements and even revolutions.
It is difficult to say which scenario is more likely to occur. If secularization
and globalization keep on advancing concurrently with European
integration and a successful transition to democracy in postcommunist
countries, the “culture only” scenario seems more likely. If new socioeconomic
crises hit the area and the power of myth and religion is recalled by
local nationalistic elements, new battles are not to be ruled out.
Crises, of course, are not only possible—they are the reality. The economic
situation has been critical for more than two decades now. Ethnic
political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia,
and Montenegro are often linked with international organized crime. It is
not uncommon for members of governments, party leaders, and even premiers
of local regimes to be investigated by international and domestic police
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