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MCWP 3-16.1 Artillery Operations.pdf - Marine Corps Community ...

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<strong>Artillery</strong> <strong>Operations</strong> __________________________________________________________________________________________ 10-31<br />

Threat Maneuver Forces<br />

Figure 10-24. Overlay Depicting Critical Targets and Range Fans.<br />

Formations of threat maneuver forces are graphically<br />

depicted at each point where the artillery<br />

will mass or fire special munitions missions. This<br />

is particularly important for the artillery staff<br />

because the FSC must understand the type of<br />

target that best supports the maneuver<br />

commander’s fire support guidance; e.g., group,<br />

series or linear target. The FSC must also advise<br />

the maneuver commander on the engagement<br />

criteria to use against each formation, disposition,<br />

and purpose (neutralization, suppression or<br />

destruction). An accurate SITEMP assists in<br />

making these critical decisions.<br />

Threat Avenues of Approach and Objectives<br />

The threat’s avenues of approach and objectives<br />

are graphically depicted. The S-2 predicts the<br />

avenues of approach the threat will use based on<br />

information from the formations he templated for<br />

each phase of battle. Threat objectives are<br />

predicted from the S-2’s knowledge of threat<br />

doctrine. This is important when continuing COA<br />

development so the S-3 does not position batteries<br />

on avenues of approach and objectives.<br />

Threat Chemical Strikes<br />

The artillery NBC defense officer becomes<br />

involved in templating the threat’s possible persistent<br />

and nonpersistent strikes, and can advise on<br />

burst radius and downwind hazard effects. The S-3<br />

must avoid positioning batteries in likely chemical<br />

strike and downwind hazard areas.<br />

Rear Area Threats<br />

The rear area insertion sites that the threat<br />

airborne/air assault units may infiltrate are<br />

templated. If possible, NAIs are nominated on<br />

these sites for artillery to watch. Since it may be<br />

difficult to avoid these areas, covering them with<br />

reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) may be<br />

the best available option. This will impact on the<br />

execution and support of rear area operations.

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