MCWP 3-16.1 Artillery Operations.pdf - Marine Corps Community ...
MCWP 3-16.1 Artillery Operations.pdf - Marine Corps Community ...
MCWP 3-16.1 Artillery Operations.pdf - Marine Corps Community ...
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<strong>Artillery</strong> <strong>Operations</strong> __________________________________________________________________________________________ 10-31<br />
Threat Maneuver Forces<br />
Figure 10-24. Overlay Depicting Critical Targets and Range Fans.<br />
Formations of threat maneuver forces are graphically<br />
depicted at each point where the artillery<br />
will mass or fire special munitions missions. This<br />
is particularly important for the artillery staff<br />
because the FSC must understand the type of<br />
target that best supports the maneuver<br />
commander’s fire support guidance; e.g., group,<br />
series or linear target. The FSC must also advise<br />
the maneuver commander on the engagement<br />
criteria to use against each formation, disposition,<br />
and purpose (neutralization, suppression or<br />
destruction). An accurate SITEMP assists in<br />
making these critical decisions.<br />
Threat Avenues of Approach and Objectives<br />
The threat’s avenues of approach and objectives<br />
are graphically depicted. The S-2 predicts the<br />
avenues of approach the threat will use based on<br />
information from the formations he templated for<br />
each phase of battle. Threat objectives are<br />
predicted from the S-2’s knowledge of threat<br />
doctrine. This is important when continuing COA<br />
development so the S-3 does not position batteries<br />
on avenues of approach and objectives.<br />
Threat Chemical Strikes<br />
The artillery NBC defense officer becomes<br />
involved in templating the threat’s possible persistent<br />
and nonpersistent strikes, and can advise on<br />
burst radius and downwind hazard effects. The S-3<br />
must avoid positioning batteries in likely chemical<br />
strike and downwind hazard areas.<br />
Rear Area Threats<br />
The rear area insertion sites that the threat<br />
airborne/air assault units may infiltrate are<br />
templated. If possible, NAIs are nominated on<br />
these sites for artillery to watch. Since it may be<br />
difficult to avoid these areas, covering them with<br />
reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) may be<br />
the best available option. This will impact on the<br />
execution and support of rear area operations.