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America's Money Machine

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152 PART II / THE GREAT REVERSAL<br />

York banks and trust companies alone had over $7 billion loaned to New<br />

York Stock Exchange brokers to finance security speculation.<br />

In addition to the bank credit that flowed into the security markets<br />

through stock collateral loans, vast amounts of bank credit were used<br />

indirectly, through the investment banking system, in the flotation ofnew<br />

issues. During the five years ending 1924, the average annual volume of<br />

new capital issues, exclusive of refunding issues and United States government<br />

issues, was $4,280 million. During the next five years the average<br />

annual volume mounted to $7,730 million and in 1929 over $10<br />

billion of new capital was subscribed. The total amount of new money<br />

made available to corporations, states and municipal bodies, and to foreign<br />

governments and corporations, either by way ofshares or loans, was<br />

in excess. of $38 billion in these five years. All these loans and security<br />

flotations were sustained and assisted by the use of bank credit.<br />

Not only did the commercial banks assist the process ofsecurity speculation<br />

by financing the investment banker and the pseudo-investor, but<br />

they purchased large blocks of bonds outright. The prospects of high<br />

yields and large profits from the turnover of investments filled the portfolios<br />

ofbanks with many high coupon bonds offoreign governments and<br />

corporations and with second, third and fourth grade bonds ofAmerican<br />

companies and municipalities. Between 1921 and 1929, member banks'<br />

holdings of securities, aside from United States government securities,<br />

increased from $3,507 million to $5,921 million. The result was to convert<br />

many a bank from the status ofa commercial credit institution to that<br />

of an investment company. The unsoundness of this process became<br />

apparent later when banks had to liquidate these holdings on a falling<br />

market. It was a policy of borrowing at short term (using deposits which<br />

are payable on demand) and lending at long term (for bond holdings,<br />

despite the fact that they are marketable, are loans at long term) which<br />

the banks would never have tolerated on the part of their commercial<br />

customers.<br />

A second outlet during the nineteen twenties for the excessive credit<br />

created by the banking system was in financing urban real estate. We have<br />

already commented upon the Florida land boom. This was not an isolated<br />

phenomenon. During the decade 1920-1930, the movementto the cities<br />

had accelerated: the population of the sixty-three metropolitan zones<br />

(cities of100,000 or more, plus adjacent counties) rose from 46,491,000<br />

to 59,118,000, or from 44 per cent of total population to 48 per cent.

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