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218 PART III / DEBACLE OF AN IDEA<br />
ble for bank purchase plus $34 billion that would become eligible within<br />
the next fifteen years, all with inflationary potential.<br />
It went on to say:<br />
If the Federal debt occupied the relatively subordinate place in the economy<br />
that it held even up to 1940, the problems ofdebt management would<br />
be far simpler.... However, the Federal public debt at the end of 1945 had<br />
reached $280 billion, or nearly six times what it was five years before.<br />
Whereas it was equal to about one-fourth of the entire debt of the country<br />
in 1940, by the end of 1945 it was now two-thirds. 9<br />
The Board now proposed that the policy of maintaining the government<br />
market be abandoned, at least so far as the short-term rate was<br />
concerned, while it offered to continue to hold the long-term rate at 2 1/2<br />
per cent.<br />
In 1946 the preferential rate ofdiscount of 1/2 per cent on government<br />
securities was finally discontinued. Nevertheless, the Treasury continued<br />
to hold an iron grip on Federal Reserve policy, and, as Eccles somewhat<br />
bitterly commented, "The pattern of war finance had been firmly established<br />
by the Treasury; the Federal Reserve merely executed Treasury<br />
decisions." 10<br />
Eccles was a man who had to be riding a white charger; his responsibilities<br />
now being confined, as he said, to a routine administrative job, he<br />
began to look around for something to challenge. He now (1944) proposed<br />
what he had thought ofyears before, the unification of the various<br />
authorities over the monetary-banking system now distributed among the<br />
Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller ofthe Currency, and the Federal<br />
Deposit Insurance Corporation.<br />
Roosevelt, however, did not think this an opportune time, when the<br />
country was still at war, to raise issues that would undoubtedly provoke<br />
dissention, particularly as there was the doubtful legality ofhis war powers<br />
to execute such an administrative change under the pretext of war<br />
necessity. Eccles tried to find support elsewhere for his proposals, particularly<br />
from James F. Byrnes, who had been' taken from the Supreme<br />
Court bench to head the Office of War Mobilization, but the effort<br />
bogged down. Eccles' term as Chairman of the Board of Governors was<br />
now expiring, and Eccles in frustration asked not to be reappointed; but<br />
Roosevelt would not hear to it, and he continued as head of the System<br />
for another four years, until 1948.