Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
The Not So Golden Years 237<br />
rates for central reserve cities from 26 per cent in 1948 to 16 1/2 per cent,<br />
for reserve city banks from 22 per cent to 16 1/2 per cent, for country<br />
banks from 16 per cent to 12 per cent (with a temporary reduction to 11<br />
per cent from 1958 to 1960), and for time deposits from 71/2 per cent<br />
to 4 per cent.<br />
The effect upon total bank credit is seen in the increase in money<br />
supply, or what is now known as M 1 , that is, bank deposits and currency<br />
in circulation, from $180 billion at the end of 1945 to $300 billion at the<br />
end of 1963. By this time the gold available to meet these obligations was<br />
only 4.7 per cent of total liabilities, compared with 7.4 per cent during<br />
the period just preceding the Great Crash in 1929.<br />
Since 1934, however, no bank depositor or note holder has been able<br />
to demand gold for his note or deposit slip. Thus, the threat to gold did<br />
not arise from domestic demand, but from abroad. By its undertakings<br />
with the International Monetary Fund, the Treasury was committed to<br />
deliver gold to foreign central banks of government members of the<br />
Fund, at the rate of$35 per ounce. Under this assurance, foreign central<br />
banks and international institutions had accumulated some $12 billion of<br />
dollar deposits or short term Treasury bills, which they treated as the<br />
same as gold in their statements of reserve.<br />
In addition other foreign holders had accumulated dollar quick assets<br />
(bank deposits or Treasury bills) to an additional amount of $14 billion<br />
all of which could, through sale to their respective central banks, be<br />
converted into claims for U. S. gold.<br />
Here was the dilemma faced by the Federal Reserve System in the final<br />
days of its fifth decade, its jubilee year. As during the 1920'S, foreign<br />
central banks had erected a tottering structure of bank money upon a<br />
feeble foundation of gold and dollar exchange. Again, they found themselves<br />
caught in an inflationary spiral of rising note volume for which<br />
increasing quantities of coin or metal were required if the parity of the<br />
paper with its stated metal equivalent were to be maintained.* World<br />
gold production was not enough to provide these reserves. Except for<br />
South African production, gold production had been static or declining,<br />
*An over-all statistic for the expansion of money supply is not available, but figures for<br />
a few representative countries are illustrative. Using 1953 as a base of 100, the International<br />
Monetary Fund reported that between 1948 and 1961 (at which date the index base<br />
changed) money supply rose as follows: France, from 47 to 238; Germany, from 49 to 232;<br />
Italy, from 53 to 231; United Kingdom, from 92 to 110; Netherlands, from 85 to 147. For<br />
the U. S. the index of money supply rose from 85 to 113.