22.07.2013 Views

America's Money Machine

America's Money Machine

America's Money Machine

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

222 PART III/DEBACLE OF AN IDEA<br />

All these bonds were quasi-money or what might be called multiple<br />

money, since any member bank that was short of lending power could<br />

always sell them or discount them at its Reserve bank and thereby obtain<br />

additional reserves. The Board therefore renewed its recommendation<br />

that banks be required to hold special reserves ofcash assets or government<br />

bonds that could not then be used as -banking reserves for the<br />

purpose of multiplying the banks' depositpower.<br />

The most that the Federal Reserve was able to obtain was a Joint<br />

Resolution of August 8, 1947, which continued the authority to control<br />

consumer credit under Executive Order 8843 until not later than November<br />

1. This authority soon lapsed but again in 1948 (August 16) a Joint<br />

Resolution restored the authority over consumer credit toJune 30 , 1949.<br />

A Joint Resolution of the, same date also amended Section 19 of the<br />

Federal Reserve Act to 'give the Board additional authority to increase<br />

reserves for a period endingJune 30, 1949, within limits of 30 per cent<br />

for central reserve city banks, 24 per cent for reserve city banks, 18 per<br />

cent for other banks, and 7 1/2 per cent for time deposits. This authority<br />

was not renewed when it expired.<br />

At this juncture, Eccles' wings were unexpectedly, and somewhat mysteriously,<br />

clipped by Truman's failure to redesignate him as Chairman of<br />

the Board at the end of his term on February 1, 1948. Truman did not<br />

notify Eccles of his decision until nine days before his term expired and<br />

the reason for this sudden act, so embarrassing to Eccles, has never been<br />

explained.*<br />

Truman professed no lack of confidence in Eccles and promised to<br />

nominate him for Vice Chairman, but this appointment was never made.<br />

At the same time there was delay in naming a new Chairman ofthe Board<br />

and Eccles continued to act as interim Chairman until the appointment<br />

of Thomas A. McCabe April 15, 1948.<br />

Eccles' reduction in rank combined with the outbreak ofwar in Korea<br />

in july, 1950, to bring the issue between Treasury and Federal Reserve<br />

to a pyrotechnic climax.<br />

During the fall Treasury financing ofthat year the Reserve allowed the<br />

rate on one-year Treasury notes to rise to 1 1/2 per cent despite a<br />

Treasury announcement of its intention to refund $13,570 million issue<br />

*Eccles attributes it to the influence ofthe Giannini interests ofCalifornia whose hostility<br />

Eccles incurred by his opposition to the expansion of the branch banking system of the<br />

Giannini-controlled Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, the largest<br />

banking chain in the U. S. and today the largest banking institution in terms oftotal assets.<br />

(Op. cit. Part 7, ch. 3, pp. 434-FF.)

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!