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188 PART III/DEBACLE OF AN IDEA<br />
For all Glass's conservatism it was this bill, and the course it set, that<br />
provided the leverage for later, more extreme measures of monetary<br />
control by the Executive.<br />
The deposit guarantee provision can be disposed ofbriefty. The merits<br />
ofthe scheme are not easy to appraise, since the country has experienced<br />
no credit crisis since its establishment. As constituted, a government<br />
controlled institution, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, was<br />
created with capital supplied to the extent of $150 million by the Treasury,<br />
by member banks to the extent of 1/2 per cent oftheir deposits, and<br />
by Federal Reserve banks to the extent of half their surplus on January<br />
1, 1933. Membership in the insurance scheme was compulsory for members<br />
ofthe Federal Reserve System, and depositors were eventually to be<br />
insured as to the first $10,000 oftheir deposits and to a lesser proportion<br />
for deposits beyond $10,000 (75 per cent between $10,000 and $50,000<br />
and 50 per cent beyond $5°,000).<br />
In the 44 years through 1978, total assessments amounted to $10.3<br />
billion; it had disbursed in deposit insurance operations some $5.1 billion,<br />
with losses on these disbursements of $350 million. At the end of<br />
1978, its assets totalled $9.3 billion, 90 per cent of which was held in U.<br />
S. government obligations. The fund represented about 1.3 per cent of<br />
insured deposits; of total deposits of $1,025 billion in insured banks,<br />
some $722 billion were covered by insurance.<br />
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the fund provided another<br />
source of financing government deficits; it also reduced the chances of<br />
panic by allaying public apprehension over the security of deposits; but<br />
it may be questioned whether its operations have tended to make bank<br />
lending more cautious or whether the contrary has resulted. In any case,<br />
under conditions ofpanic, the fund would be inadequate to meet a public<br />
clamor for cash, since its own assets are not in cash but in government<br />
bonds that somehow would have to· be converted into cash, either in the<br />
market or, more likely, by purchase by the Federal Reserve and the<br />
further printing of irredeemable paper notes.<br />
The principal immediate effect of the deposit guarantee was to bring<br />
more hanks within the orbit of Federal Reserve influence. So far as the<br />
Federal Reserve System was immediately concerned, the Banking Act of<br />
1933 was in the direction of greater authority and more centralized au-.<br />
thority over banking. Banks were forbidden to engage in security underwriting<br />
and were required to divorce their investment banking affiliates.<br />
Banks were now permitted to establish branches and to engage in group<br />
banking to the extent that state law permitted. Membership in the System