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244 PART III/DEBACLE OF AN IDEA<br />
-that is, gold not required under the Federal Reserve Act to be held as<br />
reserve against note and deposit liabilities outstanding. Meantime,<br />
French holdings of dollars had risen to nearly $1 1/2 billion. It was<br />
uncomfortably apparent to all that the French were in a position to<br />
precipitate a dollar crisis merely by converting these dollars into gold and<br />
demanding delivery. That the French leadership was not averse to such<br />
tightening of the noose was made evident in 1963 by their refusal, which<br />
we have noted above, to accept U. S. Treasury obligations stated in<br />
French francs.<br />
As the balance of payments deficit deepened and uneasiness spread<br />
abroad over the stability of the dollar, the Treasury in 1961 indicated its<br />
need for assistance from the International Monetary Fund, but as the<br />
Fund's resources were depleted it was necessary to appeal to the principal<br />
powers.* Out of this emerged the Committee ofTent which reluctantly<br />
agreed to create"special borrowing arrangements" whereby a pool of$6<br />
billion credit would be created (of which the U. S. share would be $2<br />
billion), upon which the United States would have certain drawing privileges.<br />
Significantly, however, the restrictions (which were imposed at<br />
French insistence) were so severe, requiring for instance a two-thirds<br />
majority consent ofthe lenders, that the arrangement became a practical<br />
nullity, and the device was adopted, to which we have referred, of bilateral<br />
swap arrangements between the Federal Reserve and certain foreign<br />
central banks.<br />
At the International Monetary Fund's annual meeting in Vienna in<br />
1961, the French finance minister, Wilfred Baumgartner, was caustically<br />
critical of U. S. fiscal policies, and foreshadowed a further withdrawal of<br />
French cooperation. It was recognized however that a complete break<br />
would bring down the house ofDagon upon the French as well, and that<br />
some support of the dollar was in order. The mechanism ofcooperation<br />
became the Committee ofTen in which the French exercised a decisive<br />
voice and which appropriately met in Paris.<br />
At the International Monetary Fund's 1963 assembly the U. S. voice<br />
was considerably subdued, and Secretary Dillon, who a year before had<br />
*The Fund held on December 31,1961, $2.1 billion in gold and $11.5 billion in member<br />
currencies, but these currencies were largely of the "soft" variety. Apart from dollars, the<br />
Fund held only $1.6 billion in hard (convertible) currencies. (Testimony ofSecretary ofthe<br />
Treasury Douglas Dillion before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 30, 1962.<br />
Hearings on H.R. 10162)<br />
tU. S., United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Sweden,<br />
and Japan.