Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

IRREGULAR WARFARE is defined as: “A violent struggle among state and
non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW
favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range
of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power,
influence, and will.”
IW is a complex, “messy,” and ambiguous social phenomenon that does not
lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise definition (see the call-out box on
page 5). This JOC uses the term in two contexts. First, IW is a form of armed
conflict. As such, it replaces the term “low-intensity conflict.” 5 Second, IW is a
form of warfare. As such, it encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency,
terrorism, and counterterrorism, raising them above the perception that they are
somehow a lesser form of conflict below the threshold of warfare.
The nature of warfare in the 21 st century remains as it has been since ancient
times – “a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups 6
characterized by the use of military force.” 7 These organized groups are no
longer limited to states with easily identifiable regular armed forces, nor do they
all operate by internationally accepted conventions and standards.
Defining Irregular Warfare
The development of a precise IW definition is hampered by two major factors:
A) The role of IW at the different levels of war.
B) The methods used to define IW.
A. IW at the Different Levels of War. The IW definition takes on different
meanings at each level of war because:
• At the Strategic Level, the focus of the definition is likely that of control
and influence over a relevant population.
• At the Operational Level, the focus may be on indirect approaches for
planning and conducting operations and campaigns.
• At the Tactical Level, the focus is probably on asymmetric applications of
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that may be applied differently
in an IW operation than it would under a conventional operation.
There is clearly friction among the three points of view. This friction occurs not
because of an incomplete or inadequate definition but rather because IW is
5 The current DOD definitions of conflict and low intensity conflict (LIC) are too limiting because
they categorize conflict and LIC as being “below conventional war,” confined to a localized area in
the “Third World,” constrained in weaponry and level of violence, and limited in objective. The
implication of these definitions is that conflict and LIC are of lesser strategic importance than
conventional warfare.
6 The terms “organized” and “military force” refer to a group’s ability to mobilize support for its
own political interests and its ability to generate violence on a scale sufficient to have significant
political consequences.
7 MCDP 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC, United States Marine Corps, June 1997), p. 3.
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