Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

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• JFCs must understand how to maximize their technical and human intelligence equities over the long term. • Vertical integration of USG intelligence equities from the strategic through tactical levels is essential to informing the IW campaign. Additionally, horizontal integration among lateral intelligence entities is also critical. • Cooperation between coalition and USG intelligence entities is vital to informing an IW campaign. • In order to provide timely intelligence and information to HN and other supported forces, the JFC must establish in advance, when possible, memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with the intelligence community. These MOUs should state what information can be released and what requires foreign disclosure authorization. • Participants expressed a need for a DOD partnership with cultural anthropologists or a cadre of cultural anthropologists within the Department to foster greater cultural awareness. • Participants proposed a program similar to the Foreign Area Officer program to enhance cultural understanding. This program would place military officers with local entities such as tribes instead of only the national government. • Insight #4: The IW JOC should be refined to capture the nuances of IW, informing the JFC on considerations for an IW campaign design. 2. Recommendations for Further Assessments on IW. The following are areas that are beyond the scope of this JOC and are listed in recommendation priority for future experimentation to determine impacts on the joint force. Assessing DOD Ability to Fulfill its IW Support Role. Experimentation should continue the IW study and involve USG agencies, non-NATO allies, combatant commands, IA players, and NGOs. The experimentation should address: • What are the operational challenges projected for 2020 and those that endure from today? • What is the theory of conflict and its underlying principles with respect to IW? • What are the operating principles underpinning offensive IW that allow us to challenge our adversaries in non-traditional ways? • What are the challenges limiting our concept and capability for offensive IW with respect to: • Strategic agility? • Operational planning? • Operational maneuver? • Tactical maneuver? Appendix F F-2
• What are the IW challenges, implications, and potential solutions regarding: • Extending the dialog on the practice of operational command • Joint asymmetric warfare • Operational maneuver from strategic distances • Intra-theater operational maneuver and operational raiding • Intensive asymmetric activity in the homeland • What are the implications of conducting IW operations in a Long War environment? • What are the implications of conducting simultaneous IW and SSTR operations? The Global Footprint of IW. IW is being conducted across the globe. Many of our adversaries are transnational and require the United States to operate transnationally against them as well. IO to understand the operational environments and the nature of our adversaries will require extensive preparation time and a large investment in human capital. Likewise, IW campaigns to confront adversaries the United States may potentially face will require a significant long-term investment. Both preparing for and executing IW will require an extensive global footprint for IW. Further analysis is required to determine: • The extent of this global footprint and the number of countries/areas that require US investments to establish a persistent and effective presence to meet our global challenges. • The number and types of forces (conventional and SOF) required to conduct IW within each of these countries/areas. • The contributions of partner nations to provide additional capacities to fill portions of the global footprint or to provide additional capabilities in areas denied to the joint force, either because of unique cultural relationships with the population of the area, or because of operational or political constraints placed upon the joint force. Intelligence Support to IW. Persistent, global intelligence operations will play a decisive part of any IW campaign. Further analysis must be conducted on the long-term investments required to establish persistent, global intelligence infrastructure that will enable the joint force to understand the operational environment, identify potential threats and their vulnerabilities, and to accurately focus theater security cooperation efforts to build support. This analysis must include the joint force’s ability to establish intelligence networks for assisted recovery of downed aviators, isolated personnel, and for exfiltrating critical intelligence assets. Sustaining the Joint Force During IW. The US military must provide the JFC with an effective joint force projection and sustainment system that is tailorable, survivable, and responsive to joint force requirements when engaged Appendix F F-3
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Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operat
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Appendix G - A Historical Look at I
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SECURITY CHALLENGES Irregular Catas
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IRREGULAR WARFARE is defined as:
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government or policies. The focus o
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• Civil-military operations (CMO)
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“Increasingly sophisticated irreg
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• The joint force will be require
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stabilization, transition, and reco
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oundaries and other political, econ
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• Focus on addressing the underly
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staffs work closely with IA and mul
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joint forces executing IW operation
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enhanced authority to expend funds
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