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government or policies. The focus of conventional military operations is normally an adversary’s armed forces with the objective of influencing the adversary’s government (left diagram, Figure 1). It generally assumes that the indigenous populations within the operational area are non-belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A fundamental military objective in conventional military operations is to minimize civilian interference in those operations. In contrast, IW focuses on the control or influence of populations, not on the control of an adversary’s forces or territory (right diagram, Figure 1). Ultimately, IW is a political struggle with violent and non-violent components. The struggle is for control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population. The foundation for IW is the centrality of the relevant populations to the nature of the conflict. The parties to the conflict, whether states or armed groups, seek to undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and credibility and to isolate their adversaries from the relevant populations and their external supporters, physically as well as psychologically. At the same time, they also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise authority over that same population. 9 Contrasting Conventional & Irregular Warfare Effect Desired: Influence Govt Conventional Warfare Population Effect Desired: Isolate from Conflict Government Focus Military Effect Desired: Defeat Military Effect Desired: Influence Govt Irregular Warfare Population Government Focus Effect Desired: Gain or Erode Support Figure 1: Contrasting Conventional and Irregular Warfare Military Effect Desired: Enhance or Render Irrelevant 9 Some terrorist organizations are exceptions to this general rule in that they attack populations to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of their objectives, without regard to their own legitimacy or popular support. 8
IW operations also employ subversion, coercion, attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will to exercise political authority over a relevant population. What makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its operations – a relevant population – and its strategic purpose – to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of, that relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods. Creating and maintaining an enduring, functioning state requires the government to be legitimate in the eyes of the population. On the other extreme, while a brutal dictatorship may control a population, it will eventually lead to frustration and dissatisfaction that can be exploited by an irregular adversary. 10 Warfare that has the population as its “focus of operations” requires a different mindset and different capabilities than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily. 2.b. Operations and Activities That Comprise IW IW includes a wide variety of indirect operations and activities that occur in isolation or within “traditional” inter-state combat operations. Some IW activities, such as terrorism and transnational crime, violate international law. US law and national policy prohibit US military forces or other government agencies (OGAs) from engaging in or supporting such activities. However, since our adversaries employ terrorism and transnational criminal activities against the interests of the United States and its partners, these activities are included below as examples of the range of operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW: • Insurgency • Counterinsurgency (COIN) • Unconventional warfare (UW) • Terrorism • Counterterrorism (CT) • Foreign internal defense (FID) • Stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) • Strategic communications • Psychological operations (PSYOP) • Information operations (IO) 11 10 By “irregular,” this concept means any activity, operation, organization, capability, etc., in which significant numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other nonconventional military and paramilitary operations without being members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of any country. 11 DOD Directive (DODD) 3600.1 includes PSYOP as a component of IO, but the definition of IO limits it only to actions taken to affect adversary information, information systems, and decision-making, while defending one’s information, information systems, and decision-making. However, PSYOP also plays a critical role in influencing neutral and friendly foreign audiences outside the scope of IO. Therefore, this JOC lists PSYOP separately from IO. 9
Page 1: Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operat
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Number Capability Conditions IW 0.7
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Number Capability Effect Tier 1 JCA
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Number Capability Conditions IW 0.7
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Appendix D - Universal Joint Task L
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Appendix E - IW JOC Vignette 1. Ove
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• Depose the current government o
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Appendix E • Objective. HN regime
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Red Elements. Country C. • Object
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TABLES TO BE USED WITH THE VIGNETTE
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The following table provides focus
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• JFCs must understand how to max
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in IW operations. This must include
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Appendix G - A Historical Look at I
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other conflict was predominantly an
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neither spoke Korean nor understood
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adaptability of joint special opera
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As the “long war” enters its in
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“…What would appear to make mos
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Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

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