Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

other conflict was predominantly an information war characterized by
psychological actions by the Front de Liberation Nationale and reactions by the
French. 33 Ultimately the French counterinsurgency effort was tactically
successful in terms of isolating the insurgents from re-supply and reinforcement
(border control), bringing security to key infrastructure and populated areas,
and wearing the insurgents down by hunting down insurgent fighters.
Unfortunately, by the time this eventually occurred, France agreed to a peace
accord that granted Algeria its independence in 1962 with no transitional
measures in place in order to maintain stability. There are many lessons to be
learned here, both at the tactical and strategic levels. The French use of small,
mobile forces and larger, stationary forces is a model for other
counterinsurgency efforts. However, perhaps the most important lesson is that
the levels of war are inextricably linked (or should be), and that a tactical victory
is hollow without the strategic vision and political will to capitalize upon it.
The Vietnam War (1960 - 1975). This lengthy war provides a valuable case
study in the US approach to countering future irregular threats. As in every
conflict, there are plenty of good and bad lessons to learn from the intervention
effort. Vietnam showed that the American military’s bias for mounting largescale
combat operations with large troop formations and reliance on massive
combined arms in order to dominate the adversary was not always appropriate.
As in most irregular wars, the adversary seized on the advantages of using this
asymmetry to his advantage and thereby precluded the US military from being
able to take full advantage of its enormous arsenal. A particularly important
lesson from the Vietnam experience was the effectiveness, and ultimately the
necessity, of the military working with OGAs. Where other purely military efforts
failed to bring a long-term stability or to counter the communist insurgency, the
IA activities brought about a measure of stability, moral legitimacy, and some
indigenous capacity to South Vietnam and its government forces.
El Salvador War (1980 - 1992). The war in El Salvador was a near classic
case of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The people were aroused to the point
of insurrection by a relatively small elite. As usually occurs in a case such as
this, the Government of El Salvador reacted inappropriately. However,
something rather unusual occurred in this case; the regime listened to the
issues that the people voiced as their reasons for rebellion and made sweeping
changes that irked the conservatives among the non-rebelling elite while not
going far enough for the liberal elites who had incited the rebellion in the first
place. However, the compromise seemed to serve the government well—the
primary catalytic agents for insurrection no longer existed and the population
started to lose interest. Unfortunately for the rebellion, the insurgency
continued without the real support of the populace. The Salvadorian military
was able to win most tactical engagements in the field and Duarte ensured that
his military cleaned up their civil rights abuses. This rectification of civil rights
33 Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1972), p. 172.
Appendix G
G-3