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4.e. Executing IW “I don’t think it is an exaggeration to say that the internet and global communications have changed this form of conflict [IW] as much as the machine gun and quick-firing artillery changed land warfare in 1914- 1918. I think we are in an analogous position to those WWI commanders, knowing that our traditional approach is not working but still struggling to find a new tactical and technical formula that works.” Lt. Col. (Dr.) David J. Kilcullen, 14 September 2006 The joint force will execute IW operations in support of friendly states; against hostile states; and against non-state adversaries operating within non-belligerent states. Recognizing that every IW situation will have unique characteristics, the following are representative activities that will take place: • Shaping operations will begin early. These operations will include IPE and OPE as described in 4b above. • As the campaign progresses, the JFC and strategic partners will employ numerous types of forces and capabilities. SOF, GPF, and elements of OGAs, partner nation security forces, and indigenous forces may all contribute to the accomplishment of campaign objectives. Because of the protracted nature of an IW campaign, synchronization of these forces as they flow into and out of the operational area is key. • JFCs will employ integrated joint expeditionary force packages that fuse military operations and intelligence activities at the tactical level. When conducting IW, JFCs will frequently conduct military operations to generate their own actionable intelligence and targeting data using human, technical, forensic, and cultural intelligence to illuminate the adversaries’ networks, support activities, and personalities. Intelligencedriven operations will require long-term investments to develop the relationships necessary to gain the insights of the operational environment, personalities, and the populace. For example, the joint force may establish new joint “combined arms” teams in which military intelligence and law enforcement forces join combat forces at the core of the team to accomplish this operations-intelligence fusion. • Operations will focus on enhancing or destabilizing the relationships between a political authority and the relevant populations. Operations in support of enhancing relationships include humanitarian assistance, civic action projects, promoting effective governance, COIN, CT, SSTRO, and FID. Operations in support of destabilizing relationships include UW, training insurgent forces, and providing combat and combat service support to partners. • Throughout the campaign, the JFC and strategic partners will continuously update the strategic communications plan based on the reactions of all relevant parties to ongoing operations. • After the security situation stabilizes in favor of the United States and its 30
strategic partners, joint forces will reduce their presence as OGAs and partners continue long term, steady state activities. The vignette at Appendix D contains an additional description of how joint forces might conduct a campaign using an IW approach. Additional Considerations for Executing IW in Various Operational Environments Include: • Executing IW in Support of Friendly States. 25 The joint force has traditionally supported a friendly state threatened by insurgency or terrorism by committing joint forces to conduct COIN and CT operations alongside the friendly state’s security forces within the territory of the friendly state. This <strong>JOC</strong> takes a wider view of these operations and places them within the context of a broader IW campaign that extends beyond the borders of a single threatened state. Future IW will likely expand traditional single-country COIN to include the gamut of local, regional, and global actors and considerations. This will require the JFC to employ forces not only to help defeat an insurgency in a single country, but also to defeat “an insurgency operating in small cells and teams with ‘low tactical signature’ in the urban clutter of globalized societies.” 26 These insurgent groups will be masters of network-centric warfare, but their networks will include tribal, communal, social, and cultural nets as well as electronic ones. They will exploit the internet and cyberspace for communications, propaganda, funding, recruiting, and training. They will function more like a tribal group, crime syndicate, or extended family than like a military or paramilitary <strong>org</strong>anization. Consequently, the joint force will have to defeat the regional or global dimensions of the insurgency by methods such as strategic communications targeting diasporas, supporting operations against criminal enterprises supporting the insurgency, and denying sanctuary in cyberspace and in the ungoverned and undergoverned areas of non-belligerent states unwilling or unable to take effective action against non-state adversaries operating within their borders. • Executing IW Against a Hostile State. Executing IW against a hostile state involves UW and other indirect approaches applied in conjunction with other diplomatic or economic actions such as blockades or sanctions. While UW has been a traditional core mission of SOF, executing UW as part of a larger IW effort will be different in the future. UW has traditionally been confined to operations against a single hostile state or occupying power. Much of the activities took place either within the hostile or occupied state or in the neighboring countries that either directly or tacitly supported efforts against the hostile state. This construct is changing as hostile states have ever-increasing global linkages 25 Kilcullen, Lt. Col. (Dr.) David J., “Countering Global Insurgency,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 597-617, August 2005. 26 Ibid., page 607. 31
Page 1: Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operat
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Page 14 and 15: government or policies. The focus o
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in IW operations. This must include
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Appendix G - A Historical Look at I
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other conflict was predominantly an
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neither spoke Korean nor understood
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adaptability of joint special opera
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As the “long war” enters its in
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“…What would appear to make mos
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