Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

abuses had the distinctly positive effect of garnering US support as well as the
support of the Salvadorian populace. Ultimately, the insurgency lost its energy
and languished to the point that it was no longer a genuine threat to the
country’s stability.
Examples of Waging Unconventional Warfare:
US-Philippine Resistance to Japanese Occupation (1942 - 1945). US
support to, and in some cases leadership of, irregular resistance to Japanese
forces in the Philippine archipelago was an unqualified success. It stands as a
premier example of what military planners today call operational preparation of
the environment. The Philippine resistance movement, comprised of a number
of groups spread throughout the archipelago but most numerous on the main
island of Luzon, collected and transmitted intelligence on adversary order of
battle, conducted hit-and-run raids against Japanese forces, and provided de
facto government services in a number of villages. The resistance movement
benefited from environmental factors that contributed to the overall success of
the campaign. These factors included the size of the archipelago (almost
115,000 m2 ) spread out over 7,100 islands and the imposing jungle and
mountain terrain on the largest islands. Both factors, as well as the
requirement to maintain lines of communication and supply between garrisons,
severely stretched the occupying Japanese forces. Although the Japanese
initially offered positive or neutral incentives not to resist, such as amnesty to
military stragglers and those under arms, increasing negative measures
(including collective reprisals against villagers for attacks, imprisonment and/or
torture or execution of suspected guerrillas, and seizing crops and livestock)
turned the population against them.
United Nations Partisan Operations in Korea (1951 - 1953). Success and
failure in waging IW can be difficult to judge. In the case of IW conducted during
the Korean War, the evidence seems contradictory. Although UN partisan forces
contributed to allied interdiction efforts in the operational rear areas of North
Korea, the movement nevertheless failed to achieve more widespread strategic IW
success. Most if not all of the preconditions for IW success existed on the
Korean peninsula, but a number of factors inhibited the success of UN partisan
forces. First, the responsibility for UN partisan operations shifted between
different command instruments, neither of which had developed a
comprehensive plan or phasing for IW in the theater. Second (and as a result of
the first factor above), UN partisan forces were used primarily for seaborne raids,
not unlike British commando raids in the Second World War. The purpose of
these raids was to interdict main supply routes, inflict casualties, and boost the
morale of anti-communist instruments in North Korea. Little effort was applied
to establishing sanctuaries and base areas on the peninsula itself or cultivating
the population to support an insurgency. From 1952 onwards, the North
Koreans placed greater emphasis on rear area counter-partisan operations that
limited the mobility and access of UN partisan forces to the North Korean
population. Finally, and most significantly, US advisors to UN partisan forces
Appendix G
G-4