Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

vital to success in IW. Viewing the operation through various logical lines
provides a useful tool in framing the problem and identifying the desired
objectives and effects necessary for success. No finite list of logical lines of
operation could cover every potential situation. However, the following logical
lines provide an example construct:
• Information (including strategic communication, PSYOP, and IO). This
line of operations allows the JFC to coordinate joint force and DOD
information activities with those of other USG agencies, coalition
partners, or allies to collaboratively shape the operational environment
for IW. These information and engagement activities shall be integrated
into IW military planning and operations, and synchronized for unified
action.
• Intelligence. This line of operations provides timely situational and
target awareness in an appropriate form and by any suitable means to
the joint force, supporting commands, and agencies. It ensures that
the intelligence is understood and considered by the commanders and
agency directors.
• Developing Capacity (including governance and the rule of law,
economic development, essential services, indigenous security, etc.).
This line of operations builds the capabilities and capacities of state
and non-state partners to conduct IW operations. These operations
may be destructive and destabilizing (i.e., UW or lethal strike) or may
be constructive and stabilizing (i.e., improved governance or security) in
order to support IW campaign objectives.
• Combat Operations (including COIN, UW, security operations, etc.).
This line of operations seeks to apply destructive and/or disruptive
military capabilities against an opponent at a given time under
conditions that range from permissive to hostile and producing both
lethal and non-lethal effects. Combat capabilities support insurgency,
COIN, UW, CT, FID, SSTRO, and combating weapons of mass
destruction (CWMD).
While these four lines represent the most likely lines of operation in most IW
campaigns, the circumstances of any particular campaign may require that
campaign designers emphasize a particular line in a phase or create additional
lines to place specific emphasis on a certain campaign aspect, such as providing
essential services or security.
The JFC and military and IA planners must acknowledge and maintain
balance across the campaign by continuously asking, “What will be the effect of
this action or effort on the other lines of operation, the overall political-military
campaign, and the strategic objectives?” 24
24 This question is based on an insight provided by Ambassador Edwin Corr telephonically with
Marine Corps Combat Development Command personnel, 4 October 2005.
29