Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

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TABLES TO BE USED WITH THE VIGNETTE For Country A, accomplish broad COIN, CT, FID, and civil action program objectives and tasks as outlined in the table below (note: list is not intended to be all inclusive): TYPE OF OPERATION OBJECTIVES TASKS COIN/CT Interdict insurgent/terrorist Provide COIN and CT training and network LOCs (ground, maritime, military assistance for Country A air, finance, cyber). forces. Destroy established insurgent Train Country A armed forces to and terrorist networks and deny intercept terrorist arms, money, safe havens. and/or recruit trafficking. Capture and/or kill high value Share ISR and provide support and targets. training on intelligence fusion. Stabilize contested areas and Integrate IO to enable and former safe havens. synchronize PSYOP support of COIN Support the government’s efforts efforts to bolster Country A to provide security for nation government legitimacy with the local building activities. populace. Employ effective security forces Provide full-spectrum combat, CS capable of full-spectrum combat, and CSS functions to augment HN CS, and CSS functions. capabilities as required. FID Increase the capacity of Country A security forces to defend their territory against internal and external destabilizing threats. Build capability and effectiveness of security forces to enable fullspectrum combat, CS, and CSS Civil Action Program Appendix E functions. Improve Country A’s ability to govern and meet citizens’ needs. Provide security until Country A armed forces can fully assume unilateral security operations. Assist in construction of key infrastructure. Assist in establishing basic services and utilities (medical, power, water). Conduct civil action projects and limited HA to support governmental security and stabilization. Provide support to NGOs as requested. E-9
The following table provides focus relative to Country A lines of operation (these logical LOOs were used to frame this notional campaign): Line of Operation Combat Operations Developing Capacity (Governance, Economic Development, Essential Services, Training & Employment of Indigenous Forces) Information (Strategic Communication) Intelligence Appendix E Focus Country A armed forces have the lead with the support of the CTF as required. Combat should be limited to clearly identified insurgent targets with the risk of collateral damage considered. The right of self-defense by coalition forces remains undiluted. Governance: The Department of State has lead. Focus in on eliminating fraud, waste, and abuse while promoting democracy. Country A is already a democracy. It may need assistance in maintaining existing democratic infrastructure and mechanisms. Economic Development: Country A business community has lead. Country A and CTF armed forces provide support by neutralizing the terrorist threat, maintaining freedom of navigation, and improving infrastructure such as roads and municipal buildings. Nation Sparrow will participate. Essential Services: Country A government has lead. International and nongovernmental <strong>org</strong>anizations are in support. Priority is potable water, roads, home building, community building, electricity, and preventative medicine. Training & Employment of Indigenous Forces: Help the Country A military fight their own insurgency. The CTF remains behind the scenes by providing training, advice, and logistic support. This LOO includes FID activities led by special operations component and Security, Institution Building and Reform (SIBR) activities lead by DOS. FID and SIBR are related but distinct efforts. FID deals mostly with the military. SIBR is mostly a civilian effort. FID includes senior leader visits, international military education and training for mid-grade officials, and expansion of regional initiatives to promote professionalism. FID includes individual and unit training and logistic assistance to include maintenance, spare parts, and mobility enhancements. The Department of State has lead. The international force is present at the request of the people to help them eliminate the twin threats of terrorism and insurgency. The goal is to deliver this message over a variety of media and demonstrate it when the CTF makes contact with the populace. Counter insurgent attempts to disseminate their message. Prevent access to insurgent-run websites, use of internet for e-mail and/or chat, and spam or virus-type attacks. The Department of Defense has lead. Focus is on actionable intelligence. Winning the trust of the populace is key to providing good intelligence. The locals will identify insurgents when they feel it is in their best interest to do so. Building trust and respect is the foundation of good intelligence. E-10
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Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operat
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Appendix G - A Historical Look at I
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SECURITY CHALLENGES Irregular Catas
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IRREGULAR WARFARE is defined as:
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government or policies. The focus o
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• Civil-military operations (CMO)
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“Increasingly sophisticated irreg
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• The joint force will be require
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stabilization, transition, and reco
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oundaries and other political, econ
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• Focus on addressing the underly
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staffs work closely with IA and mul
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Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

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