Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

stabilization, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) tasks are best performed by
indigenous institutions, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs),
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and OGAs. Nonetheless, both concepts
envision the requirement for joint forces to perform all tasks necessary to
establish or maintain civil order when civilian agencies cannot do so.
IW and the Shaping Operations JOC (Currently in Development). The
Shaping Operations JOC is expected to describe the long-term, integrated joint
force actions taken before or during crisis to build partnership capacity, influence
non-partners and potential adversaries, and mitigate the underlying causes of
conflict and extremism. The Shaping Operations JOC will concentrate on preconflict,
preventative actions intended to avoid a crisis-precipitating event.
Shaping operations enable rapid action when crises occur and military
intervention is required. Shaping operations are critical to gaining knowledge of
the operational environment, gaining operational access, and preparing the
operational environment for potential future IW operations.
IW and the Deterrence Operations JOC. The joint force deters potential
adversaries by the threat of cost imposition, the denial of the prospect of
success, or the encouragement of adversary restraint. The credible capability
and apparent will of the US government (USG) to defeat any irregular threat and
to conduct successful IW against a potential adversary’s homeland or global
interests could be an important factor in deterring aggression that could trigger
such a war. Thus, a credible IW capability can have deterrent effects consistent
with the Deterrence Operations JOC.
IW and the Homeland Defense and Civil Support JOC. IW operations
represent important elements of protecting the US homeland in the forward
regions of the layered defense construct described in the Homeland Defense and
Civil Support JOC. IW can eliminate or prevent the emergence of hostile
governments or non-state groups, decrease ungoverned spaces that provide
breeding grounds for groups hostile to US security interests, and reduce the
threat of possible attacks on the US homeland.
3. The Military Problem
The complexity of the future security environment is rooted in global and
regional ideological and political struggles. These struggles will challenge
traditional US military approaches. Faced with the conventional warfighting
capacity of the United States, our adversaries will likely choose to fight using a
hybrid of irregular, disruptive, catastrophic, and traditional capabilities as a way
to achieve their strategic objectives. The strategy of our adversaries will be to
subvert, attrite, and exhaust us rather than defeat us militarily. They will seek
to undermine and erode the national power, influence, and will of the United
States and its strategic partners. Our adversaries will continue to wage IW
against us until we demonstrate the same competency in IW that we
demonstrate in conventional warfighting.
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