Joint Operating Concept (JOC) - GlobalSecurity.org

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Appendix G - A Historical Look at Irregular Warfare ......................... G-1 Appendix H – Expanding Role of the MILGRP in IW ......................... H-1 Appendix I – Executing IW Within Ungoverned Or Under-Governed Spaces.................................................I-1 List of Figures Figure 1: Contrasting Conventional and Irregular Warfare Figure 2: 2006 QDR “Shifting Our Weight” Chart Figure 3: JOC Relationships Figure 4: CJCSI 3010.02B Capability Construct Figure E-1: Regional Map vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners. Our adversaries will pursue IW strategies, employing a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, traditional, and catastrophic capabilities to undermine and erode the influence and will of the United States and our strategic partners. Meeting these challenges and combating this approach will require the concerted efforts of all available instruments of US national power. Influencing foreign governments and populations is a complex and inherently political activity. This Joint Operating Concept (JOC) describes the military role in protracted IW campaigns; however, these campaigns will fail if waged by military means alone. The nature of IW requires the US Government (USG) to achieve the level of unified action necessary to integrate all available instruments of national power to address irregular threats. The USG will have to develop “Whole of Government” approaches to waging IW at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Other government agencies must build their capacity to operate in unstable or hostile environments. Irregular warfare is about people, not platforms. IW depends not just on our military prowess, but also our understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. People, not platforms and advanced technology, will be the key to IW success. The joint force will need patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people to build the local relationships and partnerships essential to executing IW. Waging protracted irregular warfare depends on building global capability and capacity. IW will not be won by the United States alone, but rather through the combined efforts of our partners. This will require the joint force to establish long-term sustained presence in numerous countries to build the necessary partner capability and capacity to extend US operational reach, multiply forces available, and increase options for defeating our adversaries. This JOC describes how future joint force commanders will accomplish strategic objectives through the conduct of protracted IW on a global or regional scale. It identifies capabilities and capacities required to successfully prosecute IW. Many of the ideas advocated in this JOC are drawn from best practices of current conflicts and history. A synopsis of the logic and key elements of the IW JOC are depicted in the following figure: 1
Page 1: Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operat
Page 8 and 9: SECURITY CHALLENGES Irregular Catas
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Page 12 and 13: IRREGULAR WARFARE is defined as:
Page 14 and 15: government or policies. The focus o
Page 16 and 17: • Civil-military operations (CMO)
Page 18 and 19: “Increasingly sophisticated irreg
Page 20 and 21: • The joint force will be require
Page 22 and 23: stabilization, transition, and reco
Page 24 and 25: oundaries and other political, econ
Page 26 and 27: • Focus on addressing the underly
Page 28 and 29: staffs work closely with IA and mul
Page 30 and 31: joint forces executing IW operation
Page 32 and 33: enhanced authority to expend funds
Page 34 and 35: with and support the other instrume
Page 36 and 37: 4.e. Executing IW “I don’t thin
Page 38 and 39: and interests. The increasingly glo
Page 40 and 41: with SOF and GPF capabilities in or
Page 42 and 43: • Conduct strategic communication
Page 44 and 45: RISK #2 - Other USG Agencies Fail t
Page 46 and 47: • Establishing an Effective IA Fr
Page 48 and 49: serious impact on the force and req
Page 50 and 51: Transformation Planning Guidance, O
Page 52 and 53: Although regular forces are often i
Page 54 and 55: nonconventional military and parami
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control as well as the intent and c
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task. A discrete action performed b
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ISR intelligence, surveillance, and
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Appendix C - Table of Operational E
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Number Capability Conditions IW 0.7
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Number Capability Effect Tier 1 JCA
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Number Capability Conditions IW 0.7
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Appendix D - Universal Joint Task L
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Appendix E - IW JOC Vignette 1. Ove
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• Depose the current government o
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Appendix E • Objective. HN regime
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Red Elements. Country C. • Object
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TABLES TO BE USED WITH THE VIGNETTE
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The following table provides focus
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• JFCs must understand how to max
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in IW operations. This must include
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Appendix G - A Historical Look at I
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other conflict was predominantly an
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neither spoke Korean nor understood
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adaptability of joint special opera
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As the “long war” enters its in
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“…What would appear to make mos
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