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Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing poverty and promoting growth and health (Lennock, 1994; Renfew, 1992) had tremendous effects on the social assistance system that had been built in the 1980s, prompting many to raise questions about the social cost of adjustment in Zimbabwe (see Silveira House, 1993; ZTWU and ZCTU, 1993). Although the government appeared to have a guiding economic blueprint, on the whole policy-making during the 1990s ‘was almost completely haphazard, characterized by policy reversals and re-reversals’ (Jenkins, 2002: 49). The jerkiness of the government’s overall policy stance was transmitted to its social assistance programmes. Some were cut altogether, others remained, though in an altered form, and new ones were adopted in hindsight as the social costs of adjustment were grudgingly recognised. This is most evident in programmes such as the Social Dimensions of Adjustment, the Poverty Alleviation Action Plan (Nkum, 1998), and the Public Assistance Programme (Munro, 2005) among others, which were adopted to cushion segments of the population from the costs of adjustment. As Munro’s (2005) assessment of the Poverty Assistance Programme reveals, however, these were ineffective in supporting those living in extreme poverty. Predictably, the increase and strict enforcement of user fees in the health sector in the 1990s produced negative welfare effects. For instance, data from the Sentinel Site Surveillance Surveys 8 suggest that the introduction of user fees kept a significant number of women from seeking prenatal care (MPSLSW, 1993). The data also reveal that the number of rural women having their babies delivered in hospitals or clinics dropped from 81.1 per cent to 69.5 per cent after the introduction of user fees (MPSLSW, 1994: 12). Other studies also report an increase in the rate of maternal mortality (Minot, 1994). To make matters worse, ‘total real health spending, real per capita health spending, and real wages of health personnel all declined by a third or more during 1990-94 …’ (Marquette, 1997: 1144). This meant that health care became more expensive at a time when the quality of service provided was declining. Specific to the agricultural sector, reforms brought cuts in government support for research and development in new crop varieties, producer prices and extension services (Rukuni, 2006: 11). These programmes had contributed to the agricultural growth of the first decade (Rukuni and Eicher, 1994). Also axed during the early reform years was government input support (ploughing, seeds and fertiliser) for communal/peasant farmers. More significantly, the prices offered for crops in the 1990s fell compared to those offered in the 1980s, at a time when communal farmers were exposed to the full cost of inputs. To add to the crises produced by reform programmes, in 1992 Zimbabwe suffered its most severe drought in a century (Benson, 1998; GoZ, 1993b; Thompson, 1993). According to the government of Zimbabwe, poor rains in 1991-92, measuring over 300mm below the country average of 662mm per year, resulted in communal farmers harvesting an abysmal ten per cent of their normal grain output. The total cereal crop of 44.6 Mt per 1,000 capita was over 410 Mt per 1,000 capita below the 1981 harvest. Thus, by the mid-1990s, the misplaced exuberance over Zimbabwe’s agricultural revolution gave way to a grim reality of, at best, stagnant food production through much of the early 1990s and, ominously, declining food production towards the end of the decade. In spite of the scaling back of government spending in other sectors in the 1990s, the government initially proved willing to continue with its drought relief programmes. In its third drought relief programme in 1992-93, the government continued with a labour-based policy. Table 8.5: Average maize, wheat and sorghum prices by decade. Period Average price of maize US$/Mt Average price of wheat US$/Mt Average price of sorghum US$/Mt 1980-89 116.043 197.347 116.197 1990-99 95.698 168.628 70.786 Per cent fall in price Source: Munemo, 2008b. 17.532 14.552 39.081 The 1992-93 version of the FFW programme had three key components: ensuring an adequate supply of grain to the domestic market; a supplementary feeding programme for children under five and primary school children; 9 a food-for-work programme for adults; and an agricultural recovery programme (Munemo, 2008a, 2008b; Munro, 2001, 2003; GoZ, 1993b). However, in 1995 President Mugabe announced that all previous drought relief programmes (FFW and FFD) were to be replaced by a Grain Loan Programme. 10 This new form of relief was implemented in 1995- 96 and again in 1997-98, following another nation-wide drought in 1994-95 and a severe regional drought in 1996-97. In this way, concern with some element of cost-recovery had also penetrated the government’s method of protecting citizens from droughtinduced threats of famine. 8.5 Social assistance during the crisis period, 2000-present What is clear from the foregoing discussion is that there are two distinct pre-crisis social welfare regimes in Zimbabwe: first, a decade of high commitment to the social assistance needs of the poor; and second, a period beginning in the early 1990s that progressively rolled back government assistance programmes in favour of the market. Scholars disagree about the impetus for the switch from a development strategy that stressed equity and the welfare needs of the poor in the 1980s, to one in which, by the early 1990s, government social assistance was minimal. One view places the blame for the shift on international pressures from the IMF and World Bank (Rukuni, 2006). According to Rukuni (2006), the austerity measures of the reform programme undermined all the advances the government had made in the agricultural sector in the first decade. Cuts to agricultural research and development were made (Mashingaidze, 2006; Mariga, 2006), extension services had been streamlined (Pazvakavambwa and Hakutangwi, 2006), input support to communal farmers was lowered (Rusike and Sukume, 2006) and, above all, agricultural marketing was less aggressive (Muir-Leresche and Muchopa, 2006) during the reform years. Another view suggests that international pressures alone are an insufficient explanation of the shift in Zimbabwe’s development strategy (see Dashwood, 2000; Skalnes, 1995). According to one variant of this position, it was not the presence of international 98
Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing poverty and promoting growth pressure but the progressive embourgeoisement of the ruling elite that tipped Zimbabwe’s development strategy (Dashwood, 2000: 4- 12). Though scholars disagree on the reasons for the government’s change in focus, there is agreement that during the 1990s poverty in Zimbabwe increased in prevalence, depth and severity as a result of the significant cuts in social assistance programmes and the inadequacies of programmes adopted by the government (Table 8.6 below summarises these indexes). Historically, agriculture in Zimbabwe has absorbed a significant proportion of the labour force. However, the violent and haphazard land reform programme cut agricultural labour significantly and contributed to increasing rates of urbanisation across Zimbabwe. This rapid urbanisation was occurring at a time when the formal economy was shrinking. These processes had two immediate outcomes. First, lacking the capacity to provide adequate housing for the increasing population, most city governments turned a blind eye to the numerous non-code dwellings erected by homeless Zimbabweans or non-permit additions to existing homes. Second, the death of the formal economy as a source of jobs led to the growth of a vibrant informal sector, involving numerous flea markets in most of the major cities in the country. As noted by UN Special Envoy Tibaijuka (2005: 23), the impetus for the ascendance of the informal sector was provided by government, which removed many of the obstacles to the operation of smallscale businesses. The position of the government regarding the informal sector changed dramatically on 19 May 2005 when, without warning, it launched Operation Murambatsvina. In statements that followed the launching of the operation, the government purported to be interested in cleaning up the cities of all illegal homes, stores and vending stalls that had sprouted across the country. The joint police and army demolitions and evictions began in Harare and quickly spread to Bulawayo, Gweru and Mutare. ‘Operation Tsunami’ (as it was referred to by those who experienced it) resulted in the destruction of entire neighbourhoods and countless informal roadside businesses that had developed throughout the 1990s. The negative welfare effect of this operation was at an order of magnitude more akin to conflict situations. The more conservative data released by the government in July 2005 indicated that it had demolished close to 92,500 housing structures and over 32,500 small and medium-sized businesses across the country. However, in her report, Tibaijuka (2005: 32) estimates that close to 570,000 people lost their homes and an additional 98,000 lost their livelihood, as a direct result of the demolitions and evictions. The destruction of shelter under Murambatsvina had ripple effects in other sectors. For instance, because the operation was carried out in the middle of the school year, education was immediately disrupted for children of families whose homes and informal businesses were demolished. Parents did not have time to enrol children in alternative schools or, in some cases, the resources to do so, given the destruction of sources of livelihood. Tibaijuka (2005: 41) estimates that about 222,000 school-age children (between five and 18 years old) were directly affected by Murambatsvina. 11 In addition to these education effects, a further 2.4 million people were indirectly affected by the operation through increased pressures on food supply, and on access to fresh water and sanitation and health care facilities. If social policies in the 1990s tended to be after-thoughts, some have described those that remain as highly politicised (Gavin, 2007). For instance, Munemo (2008b) shows how the distribution of drought relief since 2000 has relied on village headmen or chiefs and graduates from the National Youth Service Training Centres, who ‘vet’ the lists of individuals who would be eligible to receive food rations. 12 Further, as the economy has collapsed and state programmes cut, post-2000 Zimbabwe has also been characterised by the increasing privatisation of social assistance. In particular, we have witnessed an increasing reliance on remittances from Zimbabweans living abroad. However, while the number of those relying on remittances is high and the size of the flows of money is impressive, Bracking and Sachikonye’s (2008) work suggests that this informal system cannot substitute for the formal sector. As noted by many of their respondents, remittances barely keep up with eight-digit inflation. 8.6 Post-crisis options for social protection for the poor This section examines some options for future social protection policy in Zimbabwe. We have looked at the experiences of postconflict states in Africa, especially Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia, to draw some lessons on post-crisis determinants of social protection. We have also looked at nascent regional experiences to get a sense of regional discursive constructions on social protection, and have considered contemporary global discourses and practices on the state and social protection of citizens in developing these scenarios. It is clear, based on the foregoing discussion, that by the time the IG took over, systematic social assistance programmes failed to offer social protection to those who needed it. The state- run Table 8.6: Urbanisation, exchange rates, inflation and per capita income in Zimbabwe, 1985-2005. 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Total population 8,392,000 10,241,000 11,190,000 12,627,000 13,805,000 Urban population 2,116,000 2,797,000 3,556,000 4,387,000 5,370,000 Urbanisation level 25.2 28.4 31.8 35.3 38.9 Exchange rate (1 US$ = Z$) 1.64 2.64 9.31 55.07 9,896.02 Inflation 8.49 17.38 22.59 55.86 140 GDP per capita (const. Z$) 1,995 2,099 1,998 1,986 -- Per cent GDP growth per capita 3 4 -2 -7 -7 Source: Tibaijuka, 2005. 99
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