Moving forward in Zimbabwe - Brooks World Poverty Institute - The ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing poverty and promoting growth programmes that remained (mainly food aid and agricultural input support) were largely seen as partisan, politicised and inadequate and by the time the IG was formed, non-state actors played a more prominent role in social protection for the poor. The foregoing analysis has also stressed that the overall state-run social assistance system had already been severely dismantled by economic reforms in the early 1990s. As the country went into the crisis, it is clear that programmes that had survived ESAP were merely the remnants of a more integrated system of assistance developed by the state in the 1980s. As such, reconstituting and rebuilding social assistance in post-crisis Zimbabwe is not merely predicated on the resolution of the political stalemate and the normalisation of economic activity, but also on revisiting the role of the state and markets in social protection. It is clear from experiences in Latin America and other African countries that the state is increasingly expected to take a lead in developing comprehensive social protection schemes for its citizens, in ways that advocates of small government may not like. Given the fact that the protracted crisis left most Zimbabweans poor, there is a case to be made for a comprehensive review of social protection provisioning. Rebuilding social protection systems In the short term, the IG and its successor government will need to rebuild a social assistance system and establish a minimal livelihood floor below which citizens will not fall. As the crisis took hold, it is clear that systematic central planning for social protection was severely affected by both staff attrition and lack of resources. This gave prominence and visibility to individual programmes run by non-state agencies. Although funded by donors and acting on behalf of the state, the non-state actors have become the face of social protection for the poor, perhaps even being seen as a surrogate state. While state capacity to manage large, complex programmes is restored and confidence is built among citizens that state institutions will be non-partisan, non-state actors will necessarily continue to play a significant role, especially during the IG’s two-year tenure. However, it is imperative that the state uses this time to carry out a comprehensive review of social protection for its citizens and come up with a more integrated and inclusive social protection system. Such a review would ensure the state regains the initiative and visibility over the period that the IG is in power. The suggestion here is not for dismantling the involvement of non-state actors in social protection. Rather, it is for a restoration of central planning and systematic social protection by the state. It is clear that non-state actors will continue to play a critical role in the period leading up to the elections that will mark the end of the IG. Conditional cash grants for orphans, vulnerable children and the elderly Those hardest hit by the crisis were orphans, the elderly and adults with chronic illnesses. Although the state and some non-state actors have provided for some of their needs (medicine and food), available evidence suggests that not all those in need could be assisted and the programme was ad hoc in its coverage and scope. It is clear that the IG will need to think of ways to extend coverage to these groups. As the supply situation improves countrywide, it is suggested that consideration be given to shifting from food packages to cash transfers predicated on some health and education conditionalities. Food packages worked very well in the shortage- prone hyperinflation environment prior to dollarisation. Experience from Mozambique suggests that their continued use in situations where the supply situation has improved could undermine food markets and ultimately farm production itself (Tschirley et al, 1996). We suggest cash grants, as there is evidence that giving cash can instil confidence and provide a level of independence that direct food aid may not achieve in some situations. Evidence from Malawi and Zambia suggests that cash programmes can be more effective than food packages. It has to be said, however, that there needs to be a minimum level of organisation for this to work, and in the case of Zimbabwe the wide system of rural banking networks that had developed has largely disappeared. Perhaps a cash grant scheme could provide the impetus to rejuvenate them. To prevent the obvious moral hazards, it is suggested that families be enrolled for no more than five years and that the national fiscus rather than donors take a lead in resourcing the programme in the long term. In the interim, however, donor support, both technical to assist setting up the programme and financial in providing matching funds, might be what is required. Questions of affordability will be raised, given the state of the national economy. Our view here is that the IG needs to begin to show commitment to its citizens and this is one of the ways to do so. Workfare relief A major priority for the IG will be to ensure the distribution of food aid to vulnerable groups to guarantee food security to both the urban and rural poor. However, considering that famine relief will need to be sustained until people can rebuild their livelihoods, workfare relief might be a more sustainable medium- to long-term response to the severe food insecurity across the country. Labourbased relief for able-bodied adults, while keeping a streamlined food aid programme for primary school children and the elderly, would help stretch the government’s resources through the anticipated long relief period. With unemployment as high as 80 per cent and a situation in which a significant portion of the country’s physical infrastructure (sewage systems, water systems, roads, rural schools, clinics, etc.) is in a state of disrepair, trading famine relief for some level of employment and the (re)construction of physical infrastructure would be prudent. The success of labour-based relief in post-crisis Zimbabwe will be predicated on adequate technical monitoring and supervision of projects. One of the shortcomings of food-for-work programmes in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the poor conception, monitoring and supervision of foodfor-work projects. This factor is critical and affected the quality of work done during the 1992-93 drought relief programme. To forestall these problems, technical support will be necessary at the level of local implementation of work projects and not just in their planning. Adequate supervision will depend on the capacity of state institutions. Finally, the severe poverty and high unemployment in a postcrisis Zimbabwe will require inventive ways to prevent social instability and provide for the welfare of the country, that go beyond the standard programmes discussed so far. The traditional social assistance programmes discussed above (which all have an element of targeting) will have to be augmented by a broader policy that captures all Zimbabweans and re-integrates them into the economy. As such, in the medium to long run, post-crisis Zimbabwe might consider the Basic Income Grant (BIG) as an ambitious new way to provide for the welfare of the population. The BIG is a grant 100
Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing poverty and promoting growth paid to all citizens, without means testing. Naturally, all the practical and specific details of the BIG in the context of a post-crisis Zimbabwe – in which levels of structural unemployment are as yet unknown – and knowledge of what the minimum wage might be, will take some time to establish and require rigorous and focused research, analysis and debate. The universality of the BIG might be appealing in a postcrisis Zimbabwe for two reasons. First, a BIG removes the huge administrative burden of targeting that is involved in meanstested programmes. Beginning in the late 1990s, we saw that one feature of the social assistance programmes that remained was the politicisation of access. There is a perception that over the past decade social protection schemes have been used to reward supporters and punish the opposition. The universalism of the BIG minimises the possibility that social assistance will be politicised, because local, provincial or national administration will no longer have the discretion to rule on the eligibility of beneficiaries. Of course, this raises the possibility that entrenched political actors might find a BIG less appealing than other programmes that allow incumbents to direct benefits to preferred constituents. Another key constraint is the affordability of the programme for a cashstrapped state emerging out of a protracted recession. The dilemma for social protection policy is that it should not be designed in such a way that it is so costly it begins to undermine economic recovery. If experience from elsewhere in Africa is anything to go by, one clear lesson is that donors will not fund a universal programme that guarantees basic income. Although donors have shown an interest in funding pilot projects on cash transfers targeting orphans and vulnerable children, there is still scepticism that this form of social protection actually works. This means that in all likelihood the BIG will remain a long-term vision for the country and is unlikely to be considered in the immediate future. 101
Page 1 and 2:
The University of Manchester Brooks
Page 3 and 4:
Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing
Page 5 and 6:
Page 7 and 8:
Page 9 and 10:
Page 11 and 12:
Page 13 and 14:
Page 15 and 16:
Page 17 and 18:
Page 19 and 20:
Page 21 and 22:
Page 23 and 24:
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28:
Page 29 and 30:
Page 31 and 32:
Page 33 and 34:
Page 35 and 36:
Page 37 and 38:
Page 39 and 40:
Page 41 and 42:
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58: Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing
Page 107: Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing
show all

Moving forward in Zimbabwe - Brooks World Poverty Institute - The ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?