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Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing poverty and promoting growth boundary initiatives with its neighbours and is a signatory to the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park which covers Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe, Kruger in South Africa and Limpopo, Zinave and Banhine Parks in Mozambique. Whereas there may be positive environmental gains from these trans-boundary developments, there are many unresolved issues of sovereignty and national security, immigration and customs controls, veterinary concerns, land tenure, and whether participation by local people will really be equitable and beneficial in the long term. The transboundary nature of these initiatives provides a regional rather than national focus and thus with the onset of the crisis in Zimbabwe, allowed donors to channel money into the region that they were politically unable or unwilling to give to Zimbabwe alone (Wolmer, 2003). Nevertheless, overall Zimbabwe’s continuing political isolation and accelerated land reform have disadvantaged its access to international funding for developments in the Zimbabwean region of the trans-frontier parks. This has tended to sideline Zimbabwe’s participation and potential benefits from transboundary initiatives, while Mozambique and South Africa appear to be pursuing a more bi-lateral agenda. Kruger, which was rapidly approaching saturation, is seen as being in a better position to benefit economically, at the expense of its partners. South Africa, along with international donors, is perceived to be the main driver of the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park (Wolmer, 2003). 5.3 Local sustainable development initiatives and the crisis Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) Over the years, Zimbabwe has been a leader in devolution of authority over wildlife and other natural resources, which has increased economic opportunities for the rural poor. CAMPFIRE, implemented in Zimbabwe since the late 1980s, is an innovative community-based rural development and conservation programme which has resulted in sustainable use of natural resources and biodiversity conservation and has also contributed to poverty alleviation for marginalised rural people. The primary methodology used in CAMPFIRE is through promoting local community proprietorship and management of natural resources on communal land as an environmentally sustainable development strategy. However, this philosophy is not always appreciated by local people who live in CAMPFIRE areas, as they view CAMPFIRE as ‘merely another means of enforcing unpopular natural resources conservation legislation’ (Wolmer et al., 2003: 5). In the 1990s, CAMPFIRE experienced growth and progress. However, since 2003, CAMPFIRE has been characterised by a cessation of major funding from the principal funder, USAID, and the termination of NGO support, which coincided with larger macro-level policy changes in Zimbabwe after 2000 and subsequent adverse socio-economic conditions. Generally, small-scale, communally managed ecotourism projects dependent on a strong foreign clientele have collapsed, whilst safari hunting involving the ‘big five’, namely elephant, buffalo, lion, leopard and rhinoceros, has not, although operations with only plains game are currently unsuccessful. Furthermore, CAMPFIRE remains disengaged from other national and global processes and is marginalised as a development approach. It has also failed to broaden its narrow focus on large mammals to successfully incorporate other resources such as forests and minerals. Despite these problems and setbacks, CAMPFIRE has proved to be resilient and continues to be a significant player in environment and development issues in Zimbabwe, as shown by the revenues accruing from CAMPFIRE projects in Table 5.1. The majority of the revenue is from wildlife and hunting ventures. Those CAMPFIRE programmes that did not collapse with the withdrawal of external funding, primarily those with hunting operations, have flourished as new methods of benefit sharing have been developed, such as revolving funds and direct payment systems. Some current CAMPFIRE initiatives are the safari hunting model in Mahenye and Mutandahwe wards, Chipinge; joint ventures in crocodile farming in Chiredzi, Mbire and Nyaminyami districts; and the Gairezi Community Tourism project in Nyanga, which produced nearly US$7,000 in 2006. CAMPFIRE is still contributing to combating poverty in some areas through: incomes and job creation; empowerment; assets, security and future options; and diversification of livelihood activities. One important development has been the ability of CAMPFIRE projects to overcome the fundamental challenge that arose from the fact that authority over natural resources has only been devolved from the central government to rural district council level, through the formation of mechanisms such as community trusts and direct payment systems. Some rural district councils have supported the establishment of community trusts, which are legal instruments that have direct control over the management, utilisation and benefits of natural resources. There are over 17 community trusts that have been established for non-wildlife natural resource ventures. High levels of taxation imposed on producer communities by rural district councils led to some wards (village collectives) negotiating directly with safari operators and other private sector partners for direct payments of hunting and ecotourism revenues. Under this direct payment system, the 55 per cent of revenue allocated directly to producer wards, rather than the rural district council, is used for ward-level management costs, ward projects, household dividends or a revolving fund. Such engagement has seen a dramatic increase in revenue earnings through direct payments to at least one community, Masoka Ward in Guruve District of the Zambezi valley (Murphree and Taylor, 2008). Revenues paid to Table 5.1: CAMPFIRE income from all sources. Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Revenue (000s US$) 1,800 2,750 2,100 2,400 4,600 2,750 1,450 750 2,600 Source: Adapted from Jonga, 2008. 68
Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing poverty and promoting growth Masoka had dropped from over US$100,000 in 2000 to less than US$25,000 in 2005. Then, influenced by the direct payment system, revenues shot up to over US$130,000 in 2006 (Murphree and Taylor, 2008). The direct payment system has now been formally adopted by the CAMPFIRE Association. Generally, cash income from CAMPFIRE is not significant at household level, but can be substantial at community level. However, community infrastructure development and social services are principally a responsibility of governments. In an attempt to benefit individuals or groups, the revolving fund mechanism has been developed. This adds value to the direct payment system of wildlife revenue by allowing for provision of loans for the purpose of establishing viable income-generating projects. The revolving fund mechanism has been adopted in Masoka Ward and roll-out began in June 2008 (Jonga, 2008). Up to 2000, Mahenye CAMPFIRE project in Chipinge District was frequently cited as a successful model, both from its stable and participatory governing institutions and its diversification of revenue sources. However, research by Balint (2006) found that by 2004 the project performance had deteriorated sharply from previously reported conditions. Villagers were receiving annual income from the project of less than US$1, community infrastructure improvements had stalled and leadership institutions were no longer accountable. Community confidence in the project had collapsed and residents were bitter and disillusioned. This situation was attributed to the cessation of major international funding and the ongoing political crisis since 2000 (Balint, 2006). Further research by Rihoy et al (2007) found a different story, where the local traditional leadership now monopolised CAMPFIRE benefits, sidelining the rural district council. Rihoy et al (2007) also found that despite the problems within Mahenye, CAMPFIRE had a positive impact in terms of empowering local residents, providing them with incentives, knowledge and organisational abilities to identify and address problems and identify when external interventions are required. Rihoy et al (2007) concluded that community-based natural resource management is a process of applied and incremental experiments in democracy, which is of particular value because of the interaction of tiers of governance over time in an adaptive process. More recent investigations indicate that governance issues in Mahenye have improved and benefits to the community have increased. The Mahenye story illustrates the dynamic and multivariable nature of local development initiatives. Natural products enterprises Community-based natural product enterprises are commercial ventures which seek to supply markets with value-added natural products in order to bring greater benefits to communities that manage and use natural resources. The Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources (SAFIRE), an NGO, develops businesses that use natural resources, mainly from plants, the rationale being that these plants will be conserved since they are essential to income generation. These community-based enterprises include a wide range of products, such as honey, oils, tea and pulp. Trade in natural products has shown the potential to be more profitable than agriculture in southern Africa, and Zimbabwe in particular (see Table 5.2). In ten southern African countries, current trade in baobab products is over US$11 million a year, while potential trade has been projected at over US$961 million a year (Bennett, 2006). 5.4 The crisis and environmental issues in Zimbabwe It can be said that the collapse of the economy drove most Zimbabweans to rely more on nature and natural goods than ever before. We know globally that poverty normally drives those that can access nature to ‘mine’ resources with little regard to what may prove to be a non-existent future. The decline in visibility of state institutions also creates spaces for other private interests to take advantage and seek to exploit natural products for individual gain. In the case of Zimbabwe both situations occurred. Environmental management efforts were affected in several ways. Firstly, we know that staff attrition made environmental regulation ineffective due to a collapse in enforcement capacity (forest encroachment and gold panning seem to be two clear examples of this failure). This means that central government policy on environment had little meaning in the context of a collapsed economy. Absence of the recognised faces of enforcement created a vacuum that was exploited both by those acting out of desperation and some acting out of greed. Secondly, the rural restructuring occurring as a result of Fast Track Land Reform presented new opportunities to utilise natural resources products in ways that had not been possible before when the farms were considered private property. Once the farms became state property, this changed the dynamics of stewardship, and, resource-use attitudes and patterns as well. This change affected both wildlife and forestry products more directly. Deforestation has significantly risen due to increased demand for fuel wood as paraffin and electricity become less available. While the exact figure for the rate of deforestation in Zimbabwe is unknown, estimates suggest that deforestation ranges between 100,000 and 320,000 hectares per year (GoZ, 2004). Thirdly, violence and insecurity, especially in the countryside, made enforcement of environmental legislation tenuous. Wellmeaning civil servants that remained in post found it impossible, especially in rural areas, to enforce the law, as often the political environment created insecurity to person and property. In fact few civil servants remained in post and those that remained found it difficult to work in the highly charged environment. For example enforcement on deforestation legislation became inconsistent across districts depending on the political risks involved. Perhaps the most alarming evidence of inconsistencies is illustrated by artisanal gold and diamond mining which is widespread throughout most river Table 5.2: Potential natural products trade compared with agriculture exports from Zimbabwe (US$). Tobacco exports (2004) Meat (frozen and fresh) exports (2004) Total agricultural exports (2004) Current trade in natural products Potential trade in natural products 438,915,000 106,000 845,783,000 2,824,492 1,061,412,403 Source: Adapted from Bennett, 2006. 69
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