Moving forward in Zimbabwe - Brooks World Poverty Institute - The ...
Moving forward in Zimbabwe - Brooks World Poverty Institute - The ...
Moving forward in Zimbabwe - Brooks World Poverty Institute - The ...
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<strong>Mov<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>forward</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Zimbabwe</strong><br />
Reduc<strong>in</strong>g poverty and promot<strong>in</strong>g growth<br />
Officially commissioned evaluation studies<br />
At least five <strong>in</strong>ternal and four external evaluation studies of the land<br />
resettlement programme had been conducted by the time of the<br />
study. <strong>The</strong>se have yielded a lot of <strong>in</strong>formation about the outcomes<br />
and impacts of the programme. Table 3.11 is a summary of these<br />
keys reports and their ma<strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs and recommendations.<br />
<strong>The</strong> resettlement programme operated largely without a<br />
formal evaluation unit until 1984 when an agreement with the ODA<br />
provided technical assistance for sett<strong>in</strong>g up such a unit. Internal ad<br />
hoc monitor<strong>in</strong>g arrangements had been <strong>in</strong> existence however s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
1982 with monthly meet<strong>in</strong>gs and annual reviews (Cusworth and<br />
Walker, 1988) <strong>The</strong> establishment of this unit meant that ongo<strong>in</strong>g<br />
and cont<strong>in</strong>uous monitor<strong>in</strong>g of the project could be established<br />
largely as a requirement of the ODA report<strong>in</strong>g arrangements. It<br />
was at the establishment of this unit that it was realised that two<br />
separate project documents had been drawn up. One was drawn<br />
up by the ODA while the other was the operational document for<br />
the Government of <strong>Zimbabwe</strong>. Although the objectives outl<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
<strong>in</strong> the two documents were similar, the modalities and targets<br />
differed significantly. A key area of difference was on the numbers<br />
to be resettled. Furthermore, UK public funds would only support<br />
Model A schemes. Through annual surveys and reviews, the<br />
evaluation unit built up a database of the Model A schemes. It is<br />
this database that formed an important basel<strong>in</strong>e for most of the<br />
evaluation studies to date.<br />
3.12 Lessons from external evaluations and ad<br />
hoc Commissions<br />
Although there is evidence that prior to these evaluations the<br />
donors (and particularly the ODA) were <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> monitor<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the programme activities through monthly meet<strong>in</strong>gs of the <strong>in</strong>term<strong>in</strong>isterial<br />
committee <strong>in</strong> charge of resettlement and annual reviews,<br />
the 1988 evaluation study was the first formal external evaluation<br />
of the programme. By the time of this evaluation significant<br />
alterations to the orig<strong>in</strong>al proposal had been made unilaterally by<br />
the <strong>Zimbabwe</strong> government. <strong>The</strong> most significant was the change <strong>in</strong><br />
the targets for resettlement from the 17,500 families to the 162,000<br />
families (ODA, 1988). <strong>The</strong> evaluation was therefore be<strong>in</strong>g based<br />
on the orig<strong>in</strong>al fund<strong>in</strong>g agreements. This <strong>in</strong> itself is significant<br />
because it puts <strong>in</strong>to context the problematic relationship between<br />
the Government of <strong>Zimbabwe</strong> and the UK government that<br />
has dogged this programme to date. Key f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs raised by the<br />
evaluations <strong>in</strong>cluded:<br />
• That the programme had resettled more than 40,000 families<br />
at a cost of Z$3,642 (£2,106 at 1986 rates) per household<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st the orig<strong>in</strong>al project target of 17,500 families. (While<br />
this is a remarkable result <strong>in</strong> terms of the orig<strong>in</strong>al proposal<br />
targets, for the <strong>Zimbabwe</strong> government this was way below<br />
the 162,000 families it had hoped to resettle).<br />
• <strong>The</strong> programme did better than expected, achiev<strong>in</strong>g an<br />
Economic Internal Rate of Return of 21 per cent. This was<br />
significantly higher than the orig<strong>in</strong>al forecast of 14 per cent<br />
<strong>in</strong> the ODA appraisal document. <strong>The</strong> EEC evaluation study<br />
shows variations <strong>in</strong> returns accord<strong>in</strong>g to agro-ecological<br />
regions and emerged with a range of 14.8 per cent for those<br />
<strong>in</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>al areas to 44.8 per cent for the farmers <strong>in</strong> better<br />
ra<strong>in</strong>fall areas.<br />
• <strong>The</strong>se significant <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> productivity and crop <strong>in</strong>come<br />
had taken place but some of the ga<strong>in</strong>s were threatened by the<br />
collapse of the AFC lend<strong>in</strong>g scheme due to the high rate of<br />
default<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
• That the cash crops economy had seen most households<br />
mov<strong>in</strong>g away from subsistence crop with implications for<br />
food security.<br />
• That <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>in</strong>comes or proceeds from improved yields<br />
were be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vested <strong>in</strong> the unproductive build up of large<br />
herds.<br />
• <strong>The</strong> programme could result <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>creased social differentiation<br />
as some households have benefited more than others.<br />
Female-headed households were s<strong>in</strong>gled out as a particularly<br />
disadvantaged group.<br />
• That the programme had not made an impact <strong>in</strong> decongest<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the Communal lands. Evidence of this was provided by<br />
<strong>in</strong>creased spontaneous resettlement.<br />
It is apparent from these f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs that the programme was a<br />
qualified success. <strong>The</strong> ODA report put it succ<strong>in</strong>ctly say<strong>in</strong>g ‘it must<br />
be a source of satisfaction that such a complex and politically<br />
oriented programme that was required to achieve a range of, <strong>in</strong><br />
some cases apparently conflict<strong>in</strong>g objectives, has not been <strong>in</strong><br />
economic terms a waste of resources’ (ODA, 1988: 191). This<br />
endorsement is however qualified by a further statement that ‘it<br />
is however questionable whether future formal resettlement can<br />
generate comparably high rates of return’ (ibid: 194). <strong>The</strong> EEC<br />
evaluation deemed the programme results ‘not replicable’ ow<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
the costs <strong>in</strong>volved (EEC, 1988: xiii.).<br />
At the time of its submission, the ODA evaluation study<br />
report was well received by the <strong>Zimbabwe</strong> government as it<br />
v<strong>in</strong>dicated its orig<strong>in</strong>al position that resettlement could result <strong>in</strong><br />
economic prosperity. For the ODA, though the report showed that<br />
the use of the funds had not been <strong>in</strong> va<strong>in</strong>, it presented a dilemma<br />
on the way <strong>forward</strong>. S<strong>in</strong>ce the results were largely positive, the<br />
expectation was that the land redistribution could cont<strong>in</strong>ue. After a<br />
few years of little engagement, an external mission was dispatched<br />
<strong>in</strong> 1996 by the ODA to look at the programme aga<strong>in</strong> and see how<br />
it could be moved <strong>forward</strong>. Several changes had occurred by then.<br />
Chief among these is the fact that the constitutional constra<strong>in</strong>t for<br />
compulsory land purchase had elapsed and a new policy regime<br />
was <strong>in</strong> place. <strong>The</strong> programme had also shifted <strong>in</strong> focus with a new<br />
set of objectives that focused on the black elite farmers. <strong>The</strong> 1996<br />
mission came up with the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs that:<br />
• <strong>The</strong> programme had significantly slowed down and was now<br />
benefit<strong>in</strong>g the black elite rather than the poor, (someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that the major donors would f<strong>in</strong>d difficult to support).<br />
• Land shortage was not necessarily delay<strong>in</strong>g resettlement as<br />
there was still unallocated state land. It isolated constra<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
related to plann<strong>in</strong>g capacity as be<strong>in</strong>g partly responsible.<br />
• <strong>The</strong> mission recommended the need to refocus any donor<br />
supported programme to the poor and to scale down<br />
resettlement to 3,000 families per year.<br />
• <strong>The</strong> return to the ‘will<strong>in</strong>g buyer, will<strong>in</strong>g seller’ would be the<br />
best way <strong>forward</strong> <strong>in</strong> land acquisition.<br />
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