Moving forward in Zimbabwe - Brooks World Poverty Institute - The ...

Moving forward in Zimbabwe
Reducing poverty and promoting growth
Apart from changing the law, the state also embarked on
a programme to reform the judiciary. The net effect of both
programmes was that the programme that started off as a
spontaneous invasion of farms was regularised in July 2000 into
a state programme of land reform now mostly referred to as Fast
Track Land Reform. Done under a very decentralised approach,
only two programme elements of Phase 2 were adopted, the A1
and A2, although later the three tiers model began to resurface
in discussions while a wildlife version was also launched. Though
implementation differed from province to province, the key
elements of the Fast Track Land Reform were:
• Compulsion. Once land was targeted it was speedily acquired.
Often farms were invaded and occupied before the legal
processes even got under way and there was little recourse
to the courts of law for protection under private property
laws.
• Simultaneous resettlement in all provinces meant that this
was done at a scale never seen before. The fact that 5 million
hectares were acquired inside six months suggests a massive
programme was undertaken.
• Accelerated planning and demarcation and resettlement
on acquired land. Technocrats were encouraged to use
alternative field methods to allow for quick demarcation
and resettlement. This was often a big ask for most planning
professionals who for years had worked in a system that
allowed them to take as much time as was required to get it
right.
• Limited basic infrastructure and support. This was
resettlement on a shoestring and so the settlers moved onto
land before the social and economic infrastructure was in
place. This made the initial process of getting started quite
difficult. Figures on how much was spent per capita are
difficult to compute but it is clear that this is nowhere near
the US$12,000 spent to resettle each household under the
1980-1998 programme. This factor, among others, explains
the collapse of farm production as a result of the resettlement
programme.
At the end of the programme in 2003, Zimbabwe’s land holding
structure had been transformed dramatically. Apart from legislating
for maximum farm sizes (see Table 3.9) two thirds of all the
agricultural land became smallholder farming areas (24.34 million
hectares). Small- and medium-scale farms as well as large-scale
commercial farms occupy just a third of the total land areas but
mostly in the better rainfall areas. All land acquired for resettlement
became state property and 99-year leases where offered.
Table 3.9: Maximum farm sizes for A2 resettlement.
Natural region
Maximum farm size
I 250
IIa 350
IIb 400
III 500
IV 1,500
V 2,000
There have been two audit commissions already to look at
who got what land and these have brought out some key issues
with respect to multiple farm ownership and low uptake of land by
the A2 farmers. The Utete Commission started work in May 2003
and produced its report three months later. The report showed
that 127,192 households had accessed land under the A1 scheme
under and recorded an uptake rate of 97 per cent. This contrasted
with the A2 farm allocations where only 66 per cent of the 7,260
beneficiaries had taken up offers.
Apart from changing the land holding structure, the Fast
Track Land Reform Programme effectively extended communal
areas as all acquired land under A1 scheme was put under the
jurisdiction of the Rural District Councils under provisions of the
Rural District Council Act (Chapter 29: 13). This was in addition to
the fact that traditional chiefs were given oversight on these areas
via the Traditional Leaders Act (Chapter 29: 17).
3.11 Emerging outcomes of land reform and
resettlement
To examine the success or failure of the resettlement programme we
have to look firstly at what the official evaluations have said. Some
of these have focused on specific elements of resettlement and the
realisation of stated goals and objectives. Their main distinguishing
feature is that usually they are requested by donors that use them
as a tool for assessing realisation of intended objectives. Official
evaluations have either been done internally as part of monitoring
or by external experts. Such studies tend to use mainstream project
planning tools and measures of project success or failure. Core
among these are cost-benefit analysis and related measures of
project worth like the Economic Internal Rate of Return and the
Net Present Value with look at returns on investment.
Conventional evaluations and ad hoc Commissions
Conventional evaluations of the resettlement programme are given
prominence by the fact that they became the official public record
of achievement or failure. In the case of resettlement in Zimbabwe
the conventional evaluations have become the basis for either
further support of the programme or cessation of donor funding.
They therefore wield unusually high significance and to a large
extent become vital political capital. The evaluations, however,
carry no statutory significance and parliament, while taking note of
them informally, does not necessarily debate the findings or call for
action. Although the conventional evaluations are lumped together
with ad hoc commissions, it should be stated here that the ad hoc
commissions have largely functioned to influence policy and are
of statutory standing. Unlike conventional evaluations, however,
the state is obliged to take note of the reports where the contents
are of interest to parliament. As an official report, it becomes
subject to cabinet discussion that usually generates feedback for
implementation to line ministries. Both conventional evaluations
and ad hoc commissions form a public record of the state of
resettlement at the time of the study. In this discussion we have
distinguished between the two for ease of analysis. We will start
with the ad hoc commissions, summarised in Table 3.10.
Two of the commissions in the 1980s were set up before
major changes were made to the Lancaster House constitutional
provisions that limited land transfers, while the other two reports
relate to the period after 1990 when the restrictions on changes to
land law had expired. Below, the reports are examined in greater
detail.
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