Moving forward in Zimbabwe - Brooks World Poverty Institute - The ...

Moving forward in Zimbabwe
Reducing poverty and promoting growth
financial resource mobilisation, the critical issue is to open
the market to competition and create a policy and regulatory
environment that is investor friendly. The growth of ICTs in
African countries such as Nigeria is directly linked to creating
a competitive environment, lowering barriers to entry, and
allowing market forces to determine the pace of growth.
Competition encourages investment and reduces access
costs for consumers. The telecommunications market in
Zimbabwe cannot be said to be competitive with only one
dominant player.
iii. Capacity building. Countries that use the ICT industry as an
export market have invested in human capital development
in the sector. Putting the right policies and regulatory
environment in place will not of its own produce the skills
to run the sector, or attract back the lost talent. In the long
term, there is a need to create an e-culture that extends to
primary education, and promotes the use of ICT at an early
age. At tertiary level the creation of centres of excellence in
ICT is a necessity. The state can lead this but private sector
involvement is also needed.
iv. Sector regulation. A perception that regulation and regulators
have been subjected to political interference and serve the
state rather than citizens creates a lack of confidence and an
inability to fully embrace the opportunities that ICTs offer.
Regulatory legitimacy is earned through the perceptions of
the parties that are regulated, and not necessarily through the
statutes that created it. It is in the interest of the growth of
the ICT sector, and the long-term interest of the inclusive
government, to support the establishment and development
of regulatory environments that provide mobile firms,
investors and consumers with the confidence and trust that
will facilitate ICT-enabled development.
11.10 Migration remittances and povertyfocused
reconstruction
Major population movements have taken place as a result of the
Zimbabwe crisis. There are no accurate data on migration but
‘guesstimates’ suggest anything between 1.5 and three million
Zimbabweans may have migrated over the ten years of economic
decline. Most skilled professionals are within the region, especially
South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, though a significant number
migrated to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA.
The selective nature (mostly able-bodied working age groups) has
been a major human capital loss for Zimbabwe and is in part seen
as responsible for the decline in productivity and service delivery.
Evidence elsewhere suggests that in the short term it is unlikely
that those that have settled and are gainfully employed will migrate
permanently back to Zimbabwe once the situation stabilises. The
implication is that although potentially the migrants could help to
rebuild lost human capital, there is a tendency to overplay their
contribution as it is mainly those with less skill or who are educated
but not in gainful employment who are likely to return permanently.
Clearly there is a need to explore ways in which the Zimbabwean
diaspora can help in the reconstruction of the country.
We see three main possibilities
First, they could be a main source of investment capital if
mechanisms are put in place to facilitate their participation. Available
evidence suggests that most investments by migrants to date have
largely played a reproductive role, i.e. sustaining relations rather than
productivity enhancement, and where significant investment has
occurred these have been in pursuit of conspicuous consumption.
Elsewhere in Asia and South America, evidence suggests that
migrants have made a difference when organised into hometown
associations that have the support of the state. Clearly the state will
need to move in this direction if it wants to effectively tap into the
savings of the migrants. We caution, however, that the nature of
savings behaviour among migrants is largely unknown, although
some available evidence suggests that the ability to save among
migrants from countries in crisis is very limited and there may well
be little available for investment in reconstruction. The state could,
however, work on schemes to encourage savings, perhaps through
creating tax incentives for non-resident Zimbabweans, as India has
done for its diaspora.
Secondly, some migrants working as professionals have gained
valuable experience where they are. The inclusive government
will need to think of ways to lure some of them back (even for
short periods at a time) to share their skills and knowledge. It is
probably through these non-pecuniary remittances that Zimbabwe
could gain the most. Evidence elsewhere suggests that through
these short visits some may be enticed to return more permanently,
once they are convinced that they can cope with life in what is
now a very different country from the one they left. This is one
area where the inclusive government, working with donors, can
harness the human capital that probably benefitted the most from
post-independence investment in education. Targeting sectors like
health and education seems most feasible as these are the areas
hardest hit by the brain drain.
Thirdly, migrants need to feel that the inclusive government
values them as citizens and does not view them as individuals with
divided loyalties. Confidence boosting measures would include
allowing dual nationality, restoring voting rights of migrants
who hold Zimbabwean citizenship and creating mechanisms and
platforms for them to be heard. In exchange, migrants should
be prepared to pay an annual tax for retaining the Zimbabwean
nationality. Clearly the idea of taxing migrants will be controversial
but could be one of the ways in which the migrants can also
contribute directly to the fiscus.
11.11 What roles for development partners?
Development partners from traditional donor countries and new
players (China, India etc.) are unsure about how to respond to the
opportunity created by the formation of the inclusive government.
They want to help poor Zimbabweans but they have become deeply
suspicious of the country’s politicians, civil servants and business
leaders over the crisis years. That said, most donors have a fairly
good idea about what to do and what not to do: do not proliferate
programmes; coordinate activities; identify lead agencies on issues
so that transitional authorities do not get drawn into too many
meetings; pool resources; and build on local capacities. If donors
look at the Paris Declaration, most of the things that would make
their funding more effective in Zimbabwe are listed. They just need
to follow their own agreement!
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