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Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing poverty and promoting growth The word attempt is used here as in reality the programme never went beyond the pilot programme following massive resistance from the communal area dwellers that did not wish to be moved into consolidated villages again. Only 287,549 hectares had been re-planned and 9,430 families moved into consolidated villages by January 1998 (GoZ, 1998c: 9). So, these two ad hoc commissions sought to influence the direction of land resettlement in quite different ways. While the former advocated a radical programme of substantial land transfers, the latter put greater focus on improving productivity and living standards in the communal areas. The prevailing policy environment tipped the scale in favour of the Chavhunduka’s minimalist approach. What is also significant, as we argued earlier, is the effect of institutional inertia in policy transfer within the bureaucracy to provide solutions to the communal area problem. The consolidated villages that were central to the Communal Lands Reorganization Programme had striking similarities with the measures of the Land Husbandry Act of 1952 in the then Rhodesia. The Comptroller and Auditor General Value for Money Report The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) in Zimbabwe performs audit functions for the state. The head of this office reports directly to the president and parliament and is not a civil servant. The office’s involvement in special assignments is meant to restore public confidence in the systems of public accountability. Through a special project supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency that sought to introduce and institutionalise value for money audits, the C&AG’s office carried out an audit of the resettlement programme. The reasons for selecting the resettlement programme are not clear since this is already a statutory duty of the C&AG office under section 9(1)(b) and 17(1) of the Audit and Exchequer Act Chapter 168. Officially, the audit was prompted by ‘the fact that Zimbabwe’s economy is dependant on agriculture and land plays a pivotal role in the development of the country’ (GoZ, 1993a: 5). However, it has been suggested that the study was in part prompted by reports in the media that the land purchased for resettlement was being leased out to senior civil servants and party officials. Instead of benefiting the intended groups, the state funds were thought to be benefiting a few well-connected and rich people. This, it was claimed, was stalling the programme as the influential civil servants and politicians were reluctant to let go of the land. This scandal had made other donors shy away from any further support for the programme. The value for money audit was therefore supposed to allay fears of impropriety on the part of the civil servants. The audit report was presented to parliament on 25 March 1993 and generated considerable debate. While acknowledging the success of the resettlement Models A and C, the report outlined a catalogue of failures at several levels of the programme. Three areas of criticism stand out. The first area highlighted is the failure to meet the targets for both land acquisition and resettlement. Out of the land acquisition target of 5 million hectares by 1985, the state had managed 2.78 million hectares. Of this amount, 52,438 hectares were being leased out while 235,998 hectares were lying idle due either to the unsuitability of the land or lack of technical planning capacity. Similarly, out of the resettlement target of 162,000 families by 1990, the state had only managed to resettle 52,000 families. Several reasons were proffered for this. Key among these was the security situation in Matabeleland and the Midlands, lack of suitable groups to take over Model B farms, the unsuitability of existing models for the drier parts of the country, limited technical planning capacity, and the unsuitability of the farms for resettlement (GoZ 1993a: 15). A second finding, identified as a major failure by the report, is the resettlement programme’s failure to reduce land pressure in the communal lands, echoing the findings of the external evaluations discussed in later sections. An interesting contradiction in the report, however, was that it seemed to minimise the importance of resettlement in reducing overcrowding in the communal areas. The report expressed the view that: ‘even if the targets for land to be acquired and the number of families to be resettled were met, resettlement alone cannot achieve the Government’s objective of reducing land pressure in the communal area’ (ibid: ii). The implication here was that the government was not getting value for money from resettlement or that it was using the wrong tools for a correctly identified problem. A third area highlighted by the report is the significant underutilisation of land particularly in the Model B schemes, which it describes as ‘unsuccessful’ with a utilisation rate ranging from 14 to 33 per cent. Detailed case studies of the Model B schemes showed that most of them had multiple problems including poor selection, inadequate skills and capitalization, poor monitoring and political interference (ibid). The audit report recommended that efficiency could be improved by introducing ‘tenure which encourages optimum use’ in the resettlement areas. Also, it called for the resettlement of experienced farmers with resources and recommended that the costs of resettlement could be cut through recouping some of the costs from the settlers and renovating old farm structures instead of building new buildings. More significantly, the report calls for land purchase to be matched with planning capacity to avoid land lying idle. Political interference in planning, settler selection and managing interface with communal lands was also seen as a negative factor affecting the successful implementation of the programme. The Land Tenure Commission The Rukuni Commission was sworn in during November 1993 and presented its report in October 1994. The commission was set up specifically to look at land tenure issues in rural Zimbabwe. The reasons for the timing of this commission are not clear since this was close to a decade since the Chavhunduka Commission had made the recommendation. Interviews with key informants point to a combination of factors. Firstly, the new land policy that had been approved by cabinet in 1991 had indicated the need for such a review. Secondly, there were increasing calls for freehold title as an incentive for further investment. This view had gained ascendancy due to the economic reform programme that was under way. A third reason was the release of a damning Value for Money Audit Report in 1993, which indicated that the uncertainty surrounding land ownership in the resettlement areas was affecting investments. The result of this combination of factors was the Commission of Inquiry into Land Tenure Systems in Zimbabwe. Headed by Professor Rukuni, a Zimbabwean agricultural economist, the report of the Land Tenure Commission came out in support of further resettlement based on an analysis of agricultural efficiency indicators. 50
Moving forward in Zimbabwe Reducing poverty and promoting growth While ticking off the cooperative based Model B as ‘very inefficient’, its overall view of Model A schemes was that ‘the conventional wisdom that Resettlement Areas are not productive is therefore not objective and contrary to the facts on the ground particularly in Natural Regions I, II and III’ (Rukuni Commission Report 1994: 66). The report further recommended ‘a more secure form of tenure’. In other parts of the report this is a recommendation to move towards a free hold title from the permit system in place. The report also called for a re-organisation of the Model A villages into self-contained units and the re-integration of the resettlement schemes into the local government planning system. This was in response to the increase in ‘squatter’ families that had taken advantage of the ubiquitous grazing in the Model A schemes to illegally set up homes. Four main points can be drawn form these commissions. Firstly, is the fact that commissions have largely been used to shape the broad policy environment and strategic importance of resettlement rather than alter its content and form directly. Secondly, except for the Chavhunduka report and the Value for Money report which urged caution about proceeding with resettlement, the other ad hoc commissions have largely endorsed the necessity of large-scale implementation of the programme. A third point is the role of the ad hoc commissions in influencing decision making and policy. It can be said that this is an attempt to be rational and scientific about problems, especially when it comes to emotive issues such as land. This can be taken as an example of hesitation to take decisions, which may later prove unpopular. By appointing a faceless committee, policy makers can always justify their decisions as products of science. We now turn to a discussion of the conventional evaluations. For ease of discussion a distinction has been drawn between external and internal evaluations. Table 3.11: Main findings of external and internal evaluation reports. Year & Type Title of Report Main Findings 1984 Internal Evaluation 1988 External Evaluation 1988 External Evaluation 1991 Internal Survey 1991 Internal Evaluation 1992 Internal Evaluation 1995 Internal Evaluation 1996 External Evaluation 1998 Internal Report Report of the National Survey of the Normal intensive resettlement programmes, Harare Cusworth, J. and Walker, J. – ODA Evaluation Report EV434. Land Resettlement in Zimbabwe a Preliminary Evaluation. Sept 1988 GFA-EEC Evaluation of EC Co-funded Resettlement Schemes in Zimbabwe. Final Report Sept 1988 CSO-Income Consumption and Expenditure Survey 1990/91 DDF Progress Report up to 1991 Evaluation Report of Model B Resettlement Schemes DDF-Review of the Land Resettlement Programme 1980-1995. Cusworth et al – ODA Report of the Land Appraisal Mission Report on Squatting in the Resettlement Schemes • Productivity in Model A schemes higher than in Communal areas • Increased use of AFC credit facilities • Infrastructure bottlenecks affecting social life • Emerging social differentiation based on initial assets • Project did better than expected. ERR of 21% vs. the appraisal expectation of 14% • Significant increase productivity and crop income but a lot of farmers are in debt • Some households benefiting more than others & women are disadvantaged • No impact in decongesting the Communal lands • Productive institutional support could be better • ERR of 14.8% to 44.4% depending on region • Farmers heavily in debt and lending system has collapsed • Increasing productivity and cropping intensity • Cattle complex has set in • Not replicable because of amount of land needed • Pay more attention to underutilised land in the SSCFA • Integrate them with CL in planning infrastructure. • Resettlement households with a Theil index of 0.25 in food expenditure are the least differentiated vs. National Average of 0.32 and 0.33 for CL • RA have the least diversified income portfolio • Productivity fluctuating but rising • 1990 77% of AFC’s resettlement loan portfolio in arrears. Drop in loans from 70% in 1984 to 10% in 1990 • Increasing and substantial permit violations rising from 9,191 in 1987 to 13,756 in 1990 • Most are under performing due to poor selection, skills, extension advice and lack of access to loans • Some are no longer operating as co-operatives • Background of settlers has a bearing on productivity • Communal grazing problematic and needs changing • Inappropriate models for the drier regions. Models B and D have been a failure, Model A successful • Need to scale up productivity in the resettlement areas which is still lower than the plan models • Land redistribution now benefiting the black elite rather than the poor • Land shortage not necessarily delaying resettlement as there is still unallocated land • Scale down resettlement to 3,000 families/year • Return to the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ • Introduce other players NGOs, private sector • 7,000 illegally resettled farmers in Schemes • Re plan the villagised into self contained to get rid of communal grazing area which squatters see as vacant land. 51
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