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way to encourage donors to move some of their funds into areas of national priority. Policies can be much more successful when a finance minister or a minister of the government has an agenda that merits support, and the donors can get in line behind that agenda. Local military agencies have also played a role in development tasks in some post-conflict countries, in part because civilian agencies were slow. In some cases, the military has had both the financing and political savvy about the issues to go in and try to bring about policy changes. However, these arrangements can compromise other goals. Where the military is forced to assume the role of a local administration, it finds itself responsible for functions that are not normally in its own mandate or background. The military's role in development also contradicts what they may be saying to the national army of the country, which is that they should not be involved in civilian decision-making. Civilian international agencies can have difficulty monitoring these programs as well. The experience with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq should be extrapolated very carefully to other countries. There are differing models of PRTs in terms of how they operate. Some are more military led, others more civilian led, and they have different compositions and functions. Ideally, civilian agencies should be playing these roles in post-conflict situations. Useful experience has been gathered through models such as community based programs. In Afghanistan, the National Solidarity Program (NSP) is a very big community-based program that has been able to continue to work in areas where an insurgency is still active. Some health finance programs of the World Bank and USAID have worked the same way. Overall, the essential message is to stimulate economic activity early on and do it pragmatically with committed governments driving indigenous changes. However, to carry out such economic priorities while also attending to appropriate procedures is one of the most difficult things to do in post-conflict circumstances. Everything needs to be done, but everything cannot be done right away. The process also needs to consider tradeoffs, sequencing, and how short-term endeavors might affect long-term outcomes. Therefore, it is important to plan the needs of economics, politics, and security together, look at how the pieces affect each other to avoid problems, and agree on timeframes to achieve some concrete results. These linkages need to be integrated into initial program planning. Responding to Fragile States: Lessons From Recent Experience | 95
What is the most effective strategy for developing fragile or failed state policies? For efforts at any of the levels to achieve significant results, more than a single actor needs to be involved; no actor alone has sufficient resources, policy tools, or standing. 96 | Engaging Fragile States:An International Policy Primer
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Engaging Fragile States An Internat
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report would
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The compelling rationale behind the
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which had some forms of interactive
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Why are failed states relevant to U
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In 2009-2010, Pakistan, Yemen, and
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“ What is needed is government-wi
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All in all, between the undesirable
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Report Aims and Structure To help b
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What can be done to keep a state fr
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It is to be expected that countries
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Sources of Failure and Resiliency T
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all rankings come to the top, such
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“ Quite frequently, democratic go
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When such a crisis is imminent, fas
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How Can Decision-Makers Use Global
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For example, the United States star
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Why would the US and other internat
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It would be a mistake, for example,
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Life Cycle of Conflicts Peacemaking
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What Actions Have Prevented Potenti
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Notional Operation Plan Phrases Tak
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States (OAS) have agreed on normati
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4 While all such situations may not
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8 Train a responsible opposition gr
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Page 55 and 56: decision not to allow armed peaceke
Page 57 and 58: litical reform and economic develop
Page 59 and 60: Iraqi case may be turning around, b
Page 61 and 62: Can International Mediation Incenti
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Page 65 and 66: as fundamental to peacekeeping, for
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Page 69 and 70: How Can Training Enable Leaders to
Page 71 and 72: the stage for societal transformati
Page 73 and 74: “ What was driving their extremis
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Page 77 and 78: The Fragile States Group decided to
Page 79 and 80: local government in the United Stat
Page 81 and 82: not be sustainable. What is needed
Page 83 and 84: Can Responsible Governance Emerge f
Page 85 and 86: zero-sum game. If you do not captur
Page 87 and 88: “ It’s not going to be a state
Page 89 and 90: How Can “Islands of Stability”
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Page 93 and 94: here to help. We have training and
Page 95 and 96: “ What motivates people to engage
Page 97 and 98: they work in it is not a major prob
Page 99 and 100: inputs, inputting capital has a hig
Page 101 and 102: How Should Economic Policies be Dec
Page 103: ample, there are strong earmarks fo
Page 107 and 108: However, the prevailing unilateral
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Page 111 and 112: in development aid, providing rough
Page 113 and 114: What Obstacles Stand in the Way? Un
Page 115 and 116: UN acts essentially as if in a cons
Page 117 and 118: “ The basic problem the EU shares
Page 119 and 120: tion in capacity-building and techn
Page 121 and 122: predictably defense planners have a
Page 123 and 124: “ Until Congress recognizes the d
Page 125 and 126: ties. This leads to the overall SRP
Page 127 and 128: How can the US effectively meet the
Page 129 and 130: Analytical tools for identifying th
Page 131 and 132: and political disputes. As Part I d
Page 133 and 134: atrocities from happening at all, a
Page 135 and 136: tition and bargaining among key lea
Page 137 and 138: tunities to build public interest-o
Page 139 and 140: fragile states, modest steps can be
Page 141 and 142: Endnotes 1 The State Fragility Inde
Page 143 and 144: Bibliography “10-Step BEFORE Appr
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