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decision not to allow armed peacekeepers to go outside Kabul <strong>for</strong> two years after<br />

the Taliban fell, and the refusal to allow US <strong>for</strong>ces to engage in security or peacekeeping<br />

operations, provided space <strong>for</strong> the re-emergence of an organized, violent<br />

resistance movement. This decision also missed the opportunity to gain the loyalty<br />

of large segments of the population who live in the contested areas.<br />

To redress this situation, many new elements are being added to the Obama<br />

Administration’s complex strategy <strong>for</strong> Afghanistan. After General Petraeus’s assignment<br />

to Iraq in 2007, the US embarked on a counter-insurgency campaign<br />

in which public security was the primary metric <strong>for</strong> determining whether it was<br />

succeeding or failing. After invading Iraq, <strong>for</strong> the first four years the US regarded<br />

the number of Iraqis that were killed irrelevant as an indicator of success or failure.<br />

However, when Petraeus came back and reported to Congress, he used the<br />

fact that fewer Iraqis were getting killed as a metric. General McChrystal, the US<br />

General in charge in Afghanistan at the time, has testified that his main metric<br />

was also reducing Afghan civilian casualties.<br />

For assuring the population of security, it makes little difference whether<br />

civilians are killed by the Taliban or US troops. Either effect will aggravate the<br />

feeling of insecurity among Afghan civilians and can result in their refusing<br />

to cooperate in marginalizing extremists. The problems of corruption, lack<br />

of adequate government services, and inability to deliver services at any distance<br />

from Kabul cannot be ignored, but simply putting a lot of money into<br />

a chaotic situation will not yield effective results. Only when a more secure<br />

environment is guaranteed will investments and socio-economic change start<br />

to make a difference. Economic development can help to support security, but<br />

the dominant causation is <strong>for</strong> security to lead to economic development. Once<br />

security is established, positive growth will take place even if nothing is done<br />

particularly to promote it.<br />

The next priority is humanitarian assistance. This is essential <strong>for</strong> providing<br />

basic material needs such as food, medicine, shelter, and refugee assistance.<br />

Following this is the issue of governance, meaning the provision of basic public<br />

services, such as reopening of schools and hospitals, providing fresh running<br />

water, and sanitation services. Following that is the priority of economic stabilization.<br />

This refers to stabilizing the currency, reopening the borders and markets,<br />

and taking other immediate measures necessary to allow commerce and trade to<br />

operate effectively. This is virtually a cost-free undertaking, but it does require a<br />

sophisticated knowledge of how to rebuild the central banking system to be operational.<br />

These activities are also politically delicate, <strong>for</strong> they challenge and unavoidably<br />

alter existing power structures.<br />

The policy community has frequently debated the relationship between po-<br />

46 | Engaging Fragile States:An <strong>International</strong> Policy Primer

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