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RETOOLING CURRENT POLICIES Addressing fragile and failed states more effectively is not just a matter of adding resources to, or shifting resources among, the existing development, defense, and other policies so they conduct business as usual. The guidelines outlined below suggest the necessary steps in developing a comprehensive and strategic fragile or failed state policy. 1 Define the challenge as fragility rather then collapse. Define the challenge to be addressed as state fragility, not just ultimate collapse or imminent crisis. Currently, deciding on priority countries is driven almost exclusively by having to react to immensely difficult crises unfolding in places where existing analyses often have already suggested that major downturns were likely. Instead of taking a “wait and see” attitude toward weak states, US policy should actively avert state failure in those that are currently listed as fragile. These states can be identified through continuous monitoring by global fragility indexes and triangulating their findings. In 2009-10, Pakistan, Yemen and Haiti each illustrated how quickly fragile countries on the edges of global radar screens suddenly moved to the center. US energies and resources would go much further in reducing the threats from failed states if policy objectives shifted towards prevention for fragile states by taking advantage of the existing resilient capacities within these societies that can be built upon. Specifically, decisions about US priority countries should give more weight to the indicators of fragility in a wider range of states—not just the already failed countries colored red, but those in orange and yellow. These include the large number of anocracies or illiberal democracies that are neither authoritarian nor consolidated democracies that make them especially vulnerable to the instabilities being aggravated by the financial crisis, globalization, and rapid communications. This orientation also calls for more considered strategies toward current authoritarian regimes—not to overthrow them or promote upheaval, for that would likely lead to massive loss of life and further weakness—to foster peaceful evolution to more effective and dynamic forms of government. Contrary to the impression that media stories may convey, violent conflicts do not suddenly explode; they are preceded by increasing tensions around societal Implications and Applications: Retooling Current Policies | 121
and political disputes. As Part I discussed, moments and entry points are available for taking deliberate actions to bolster a society’s resiliencies and strengthen its conflict-handling capacities so as to avoid the degenerating effects of increasing polarization. If they pay close attention to the many watch lists of fragile states and conflict early warning systems, decisionmakers have considerable time and multiple opportunities to test the lessons from experience by acting before it is much harder to contain crises and escalatory cycles. During this period, close analysis can be done of each state in terms of the nature, degree, and sources of the particular state’s fragility involved, such as distinguishing among states that are “willing but not able,” “unwilling and unable,” and so on, as a guide to reshaping the policies toward them. This shift in focus requires certain changes in current perspectives and tendencies. Policy toward fragile states should not be conceived as special or extraordinary actions that are taken on top of the ongoing normal policies toward such countries. The most workable approach to addressing fragile states differently is to infuse appropriate criteria, analysis, and procedures into existing programming by the agencies that already operate on the ground, rather than relying on special units that enter the picture only when alarm bells go off. As developed below, making a distinction between normal policies in these settings and special interventions taken at particular crisis moments is misleading. The last minute responses will often either be too late to avoid incurring huge costs from major interventions or the awaited dramatic events may never happen because a state’s deterioration is gradual. Rather, actions toward fragility should be woven into the fabric of and modify current policies so that they become mainstreamed. This shift means getting out from under the domination of media discourse about “hotspots” and “flashpoints,” as well as corresponding notions such as “rapid response” and “civilian surge.” Those terms frame the problem only as a matter of reacting to major crises or cataclysms. The shift also means less emphasis on the nearly exclusive US focus on the costly job of repairing already failed post-conflict states. The US cannot afford to play catch-up to recurrent problems of state failure. Redefining the problem could also reduce the tendency to use up scarce resources on oversubscribed "aid darlings" on the one hand, and to deprive "aid orphans" on the other. It would help to reduce the volatility of aid by modulating it over the years more appropriately in relation to the capacities within given countries. Finally, this reorientation debunks a widespread fallacy that has unnecessarily inhibited preventive approaches to conflict and state failure; namely, the assumption that acting proactively cannot show results because if one succeeds, nothing happens. It is then argued that few incentives exist for taking preventive action because no 122 | Engaging Fragile States: An International Policy Primer
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Engaging Fragile States An Internat
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report would
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The compelling rationale behind the
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which had some forms of interactive
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Why are failed states relevant to U
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In 2009-2010, Pakistan, Yemen, and
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“ What is needed is government-wi
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All in all, between the undesirable
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Report Aims and Structure To help b
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What can be done to keep a state fr
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It is to be expected that countries
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Sources of Failure and Resiliency T
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all rankings come to the top, such
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“ Quite frequently, democratic go
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When such a crisis is imminent, fas
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How Can Decision-Makers Use Global
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For example, the United States star
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Why would the US and other internat
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It would be a mistake, for example,
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Life Cycle of Conflicts Peacemaking
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What Actions Have Prevented Potenti
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Notional Operation Plan Phrases Tak
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States (OAS) have agreed on normati
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4 While all such situations may not
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8 Train a responsible opposition gr
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14 Over time, support the creation
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decision not to allow armed peaceke
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litical reform and economic develop
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Iraqi case may be turning around, b
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Can International Mediation Incenti
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“ To the extent that actors see t
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as fundamental to peacekeeping, for
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term on the immediate threats and o
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How Can Training Enable Leaders to
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the stage for societal transformati
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“ What was driving their extremis
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participants on board and to have t
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The Fragile States Group decided to
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