engaging fragile states - Woodrow Wilson International Center for ...

For example, the United States started with strong institutions at the beginning
of the 19th century but saw those institutions break down as the polarization over
slaveholding grew more acute.
This presents the delicate issue of whether to intercede externally in a country’s
dynamics in order to ensure stability, or instead, to allow the country to learn
on its own how to manage its conflicts. Might it be better to let it fail in some
way to increase the incentive to learn how to manage issue factionalism properly?
Goldstone suggested that this dilemma might be eased if external efforts provide
local leaders with the proper skill set to work through their own resolutions of
emerging conflicts, such as along the lines of the leadership training done by the
Wilson Center (discussed under Part III).
Any agreements that are reached then need to be carried out. Because fragile
states cannot hold themselves accountable in most cases, Marshall urged outside
parties to work to arrange accountability guarantees. In addition to effective
mediation, in the new democracy-dominant world system, another way parties
can be held to their commitments is election assistance and monitors. The overall
point is to build effective institutions that serve as tools for addressing conflicts,
whether they are issues of democracy, social service, or economic policy. Aid to
build capable institutions can be especially effective, as increased state capacity is
largely associated with decreasing fragility.
One key institution is the military. Reducing the tendency to rely on coercive
policies can be done by professionalizing the military, commonly known as security
sector reform (SSR). Rather than looking to provide security guarantees in
situations that are out of control, international actors should regard them as a last
resort. What is more effective is preventing the state from cracking down on oppositions
by keeping the military in the barracks until the emotional moments of
a crisis have passed. “Riled up masses will calm down eventually if not confronted
by a show of extreme coercion, whereas harsh repression can escalate into open
warfare,” Marshall asserted.
While there has been some progress in recent years in addressing the peculiar
characteristics of fragile and failed states, most US and international policies are
not oriented to their special features. For example, the distribution of foreign aid is
largely random. Ideally, the states that are lowest in capacity and the most fragile
would be getting the bulk of the aid, but the reality is quite different. Many states
ranking high in fragility receive far less than they should be receiving in view of
their poor performance. While Afghanistan is an aid darling, countries like Togo
are off the radar screen. Also, due to lack of a supportive policy environment to
begin with, a fragile state cannot be relied on to use aid investments wisely or
properly. Yet other countries receive aid far in excess of what they should, despite
their lack of adequate capacity to absorb or use it properly. An effective amount of
26 | Engaging Fragile States:An International Policy Primer