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window of opportunity to achieve post-conflict peace could close. In some situations, the mediator may have considerable leverage over the structure or substance of the agreement. This is afforded most dramatically when the previous state structure has been destroyed, as happened in Iraq. But leverage can exist far short of that. If the mediator has sufficient leverage to hold the structure or the substance, the opportunity exists to give the country’s citizens a chance to take the structure into their own hands. A tactical question the mediator must address is whether to bring the extremists into the talks, as they could prevent any kind of agreement. It will never be known, for example, what would have happened in Rwanda in 1993-4 if the Hutu CDR extremists had been brought into the Arusha talks. In other cases, such as Sri Lanka, the mediator may not have sufficient leverage vis-à-vis the warring parties to hold that structure in his or her hands. In this circumstance, there is little the mediator can do. Either he or she is invited in or alternately, takes the initiative and has enough leverage. In any case, the present structure of international relations means that third party mediators from international organizations or mediator states are expected to deal with their counterparts, which are the leaders of the state. In state-to-state relations, the mediator does not put people in power, but deals with the people who are in power. Even though this grants the mediator an opportunity to develop good relations with the country to which he or she is accredited, this “diplomacy as usual” approach can create problems. Second, in Zartman’s words, "the mediator can set the machine running and turn the crank, but it has to go by itself down the road." If instead, various crutches are written into the agreement, such as providing for the mediator to always be involved afterwards, this can become habit-forming. The country will never be left on its own to learn to deal with its own conflicts and never develop the capacity to handle its own problems. Third, notwithstanding the need to let the country go on its own, one can still utilize diplomatic tools, such as applying carrots and sticks, to keep the machine somewhat on track and for developing its capacity and effectiveness. Capacity and effectiveness are the keys to state building. A state whose capacity and effectiveness is well-anchored is a state that is responsive to its people by being participatory and accountable. In that sense, the crux of the problem is to listen to the needs and requirements of the people, as well as to the requirements of peace and conflict resolution. In regard to Iraq, it has been argued that the US has not failed to provide for a democratic society; there is more democracy there than existed before. However, the US did not provide services from the very beginning, did not buttress the new government so it could be effective, did not provide for disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR), and did not develop local organizations. Responding to Fragile States: Lessons From Recent Experience | 53
“ To the extent that actors see themselves as engaging in a long-term process of building the fundamental rules of the state through constitutional deliberation and participating in an ongoing series of elections, the parties’ commitment to accepting a cease fire and programs like disarmament and demobilization is likely to come easier.” Terrence Lyons Equally important in keeping the machine on track is the support of regional organizations and neighbors in upholding standards—in other words, what the new state has to do to be an upstanding participant in the international community. In Mauritania, the July 2009 elections may have been flawed in some aspects, as opposition leaders claimed, and the election of military strongman Abd Al-Aziz was preordained. However, at least the important step was taken to try to remain within the international community by holding elections and putting in a government that has been elected, and this has met with general international approval. Another important aspect of state-building is to support inclusion. One of the greatest grievances in conflicts today is the exclusion of groups, whether minorities or majorities, each of whom believe they deserve a role in the determination of their own affairs. These carrots and sticks require that the international community stay engaged once the peace has been installed. Peace is the precondition, no doubt, but peace has to carry with it the promise of justice, of effectiveness, and of handling grievances that led to the conflict. Outside actors need to remain involved to reward the positive actions that are taken and punish deviations from that path. Examples of sustained peace due to the continued presence of international agents can be cited. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, legitimate leaders came to power and support was given in various degrees to ongoing governance. In South Africa, the people themselves were responsible for keeping the train on the track in their post-conflict situation. In this case, there was international support, but not mediation after the 54 | Engaging Fragile States: An International Policy Primer
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Engaging Fragile States An Internat
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report would
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The compelling rationale behind the
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which had some forms of interactive
Page 11 and 12: Why are failed states relevant to U
Page 13 and 14: In 2009-2010, Pakistan, Yemen, and
Page 15 and 16: “ What is needed is government-wi
Page 17 and 18: All in all, between the undesirable
Page 19 and 20: Report Aims and Structure To help b
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Page 23 and 24: It is to be expected that countries
Page 25 and 26: Sources of Failure and Resiliency T
Page 27 and 28: all rankings come to the top, such
Page 29 and 30: “ Quite frequently, democratic go
Page 31 and 32: When such a crisis is imminent, fas
Page 33 and 34: How Can Decision-Makers Use Global
Page 35 and 36: For example, the United States star
Page 37 and 38: Why would the US and other internat
Page 39 and 40: It would be a mistake, for example,
Page 41 and 42: Life Cycle of Conflicts Peacemaking
Page 43 and 44: What Actions Have Prevented Potenti
Page 45 and 46: Notional Operation Plan Phrases Tak
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Page 49 and 50: 4 While all such situations may not
Page 51 and 52: 8 Train a responsible opposition gr
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Page 55 and 56: decision not to allow armed peaceke
Page 57 and 58: litical reform and economic develop
Page 59 and 60: Iraqi case may be turning around, b
Page 61: Can International Mediation Incenti
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Page 67 and 68: term on the immediate threats and o
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Page 73 and 74: “ What was driving their extremis
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Page 79 and 80: local government in the United Stat
Page 81 and 82: not be sustainable. What is needed
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Page 85 and 86: zero-sum game. If you do not captur
Page 87 and 88: “ It’s not going to be a state
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Page 93 and 94: here to help. We have training and
Page 95 and 96: “ What motivates people to engage
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Page 101 and 102: How Should Economic Policies be Dec
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What Obstacles Stand in the Way? Un
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UN acts essentially as if in a cons
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“ The basic problem the EU shares
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tion in capacity-building and techn
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predictably defense planners have a
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“ Until Congress recognizes the d
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ties. This leads to the overall SRP
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How can the US effectively meet the
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Analytical tools for identifying th
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and political disputes. As Part I d
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atrocities from happening at all, a
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tition and bargaining among key lea
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tunities to build public interest-o
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fragile states, modest steps can be
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Endnotes 1 The State Fragility Inde
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Bibliography “10-Step BEFORE Appr
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