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Placing socio-economic development measures at this point in the sequence contradicts the common idea that addressing root causes will somehow dissolve the other manifestations of a conflict, such as the political competition and rivalry among factions. A widespread, mistaken assumption is that anti-poverty and other economic development efforts ipso facto will reduce conflict. Improving those conditions alone will not cause the political issues to dissipate. The evidence suggests that the immediate threats and political processes have to be engaged before real chances to get at deeper causes arrive. Only in conjunction with progress in political resolution will such efforts begin to build a durable peace. 12 These actions should be taken wherever possible through the channels of existing state institutions that have some authority, in order to strengthen their legitimacy. Usually, there remains some remnants of state bureaucracies and civil services that function in some degree. Some autonomy in institutional authority may exist, through which some governmental entities retain prerogatives to serve civil society. Even the ruling party in a one-party state may have rules or procedures for internal representation of competing interests. Through these channels, peaceful negotiations may be possible and their use may encourage greater reciprocity and accommodation among competing societal interests. The challenge is to work with those organizations and processes in order to gradually move governance away from arbitrary forms of personal rule and patronage politics, towards a more rule-governed form of politics and administration in which a government of laws prevails rather than a government of persons, and in which public officials operate within certain agreed-on procedures and divisions of authority. 13 Support of the implementation of negotiated policies through monitoring civilian capacities and promoting an increasingly independent civil society. Creating such a force is crucial in the longer-run in order to keep politicians accountable to adhere to the rules that they agreed upon through any new negotiated pacts. In the short-run, civil society and NGOs are characteristically weak, fragmented, and themselves highly politicized. Initially, they are not able to act as an antidote to the machinations of upper-level politicians. Nevertheless, efforts are needed over the medium-term to strengthen fragmented civil society actors so they reinforce peaceful change at the top. Responding to Fragile States: Lessons From Recent Experience | 43
14 Over time, support the creation of regular channels for meaningful political expression, such as decentralized government and elections, as long as they are implemented within a relatively stable rule-governed institutional framework. Contrary to many current assumptions, setting up democratic institutions should follow, rather than precede, the fostering of political consensus. The previous actions are not to be rigidly sequenced in a strict chronological order. They identify critical priorities that need to be focused earlier on rather than later when attempting to prevent conflict from occurring. Some tasks, such as security, do need to be largely accomplished before action is taken on other tasks. Overall, what is advised is a certain staggering of actions and resource allocations, although simultaneous implementation is possible in many cases. These guidelines emerge from general patterns of preventive measures taken in the recent past. Decision-makers who consider these findings while crafting prevention strategies will have better chances of succeeding than by using conjecture or stock approaches. However, as with all guidelines for contemplated courses of action, even if they are based on empirical evidence in many cases, they should not be applied systematically to any and all situations. They are useful as a checklist of grounded lessons when planning a strategy in order to consider the extent to which they are needed and feasible in that each specific case. They will also be more difficult to carry out depending on contextual factors, such as the extent to which of past conflicts in the country, the absence of institutional precedents, the degree of inter-group polarization, the balance of power between them, the weakness of existing institutions, and the direction of influences from neighboring countries. In short, the lessons need to be treated as hypotheses that may or may not apply, thus stimulating deeper inquiry into each context. Generally, until the international community has seen the horror of conflict on CNN, it is not inclined to spend the money and deploy the resources necessary to avert a conflict. That tendency may be changing, in part because the evidence is showing that proactive initiatives can make a definite difference and guidelines exist for how to proceed. 44 | Engaging Fragile States: An International Policy Primer
Page 1 and 2: Engaging Fragile States An Internat
Page 4 and 5: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report would
Page 6 and 7: The compelling rationale behind the
Page 8: which had some forms of interactive
Page 11 and 12: Why are failed states relevant to U
Page 13 and 14: In 2009-2010, Pakistan, Yemen, and
Page 15 and 16: “ What is needed is government-wi
Page 17 and 18: All in all, between the undesirable
Page 19 and 20: Report Aims and Structure To help b
Page 21 and 22: What can be done to keep a state fr
Page 23 and 24: It is to be expected that countries
Page 25 and 26: Sources of Failure and Resiliency T
Page 27 and 28: all rankings come to the top, such
Page 29 and 30: “ Quite frequently, democratic go
Page 31 and 32: When such a crisis is imminent, fas
Page 33 and 34: How Can Decision-Makers Use Global
Page 35 and 36: For example, the United States star
Page 37 and 38: Why would the US and other internat
Page 39 and 40: It would be a mistake, for example,
Page 41 and 42: Life Cycle of Conflicts Peacemaking
Page 43 and 44: What Actions Have Prevented Potenti
Page 45 and 46: Notional Operation Plan Phrases Tak
Page 47 and 48: States (OAS) have agreed on normati
Page 49 and 50: 4 While all such situations may not
Page 51: 8 Train a responsible opposition gr
Page 55 and 56: decision not to allow armed peaceke
Page 57 and 58: litical reform and economic develop
Page 59 and 60: Iraqi case may be turning around, b
Page 61 and 62: Can International Mediation Incenti
Page 63 and 64: “ To the extent that actors see t
Page 65 and 66: as fundamental to peacekeeping, for
Page 67 and 68: term on the immediate threats and o
Page 69 and 70: How Can Training Enable Leaders to
Page 71 and 72: the stage for societal transformati
Page 73 and 74: “ What was driving their extremis
Page 75 and 76: participants on board and to have t
Page 77 and 78: The Fragile States Group decided to
Page 79 and 80: local government in the United Stat
Page 81 and 82: not be sustainable. What is needed
Page 83 and 84: Can Responsible Governance Emerge f
Page 85 and 86: zero-sum game. If you do not captur
Page 87 and 88: “ It’s not going to be a state
Page 89 and 90: How Can “Islands of Stability”
Page 91 and 92: “ There is a peculiar assumption
Page 93 and 94: here to help. We have training and
Page 95 and 96: “ What motivates people to engage
Page 97 and 98: they work in it is not a major prob
Page 99 and 100: inputs, inputting capital has a hig
Page 101 and 102: How Should Economic Policies be Dec
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ample, there are strong earmarks fo
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What is the most effective strategy
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However, the prevailing unilateral
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directions. Through their seats, th
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in development aid, providing rough
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What Obstacles Stand in the Way? Un
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UN acts essentially as if in a cons
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“ The basic problem the EU shares
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tion in capacity-building and techn
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predictably defense planners have a
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“ Until Congress recognizes the d
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ties. This leads to the overall SRP
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How can the US effectively meet the
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Analytical tools for identifying th
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and political disputes. As Part I d
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atrocities from happening at all, a
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tition and bargaining among key lea
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tunities to build public interest-o
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fragile states, modest steps can be
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Endnotes 1 The State Fragility Inde
Page 143 and 144:
Bibliography “10-Step BEFORE Appr
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