engaging fragile states - Woodrow Wilson International Center for ...

the State Department and USAID. In the opinion of Dane Smith, S/CRS should
become a fully integrated State Department-USAID operation. S/CRS has had
one coordinator and one deputy coordinator who had both previously been with
USAID, but no one else from that agency has since occupied similar posts. In his
view, up to a third of high-level S/CRS positions should be USAID officers in
order to inject their operational depth into programmatic planning and convey a
message of commitment to operational capability. But the delivery potential capabilities
on the civilian side of government with respect to near-term governance
intervention are located at USAID. This capability should be exploited, built and
developed in order to become stronger and more adept. Operations on the ground
should also integrate CMM to take on conflict prevention operations, while also
integrating the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to serve as the foundation for
the active component of CRC.
NSC should focus on the oversight of operations, a function that must be more
institutionalized within the US government architecture. Contingency funding
is another area that falls under the responsibility of this agency. The Foreign
Relations Authorization Act tries to address contingency funds in section 841
when it states “The Secretary of State is authorized to conduct a program to respond
to contingencies in foreign countries or regions by providing training, procurement,
and capacity-building of a foreign country’s national military forces
and dedicated counter-terrorism forces.” At this juncture, 841 is underfunded and
not yet a fully designed option, which is clearly an issue that needs to be addressed
in a consultation between the executive branch and the legislature so that both are
willing to sign off on a package.
Finally, of paramount importance is the need for conflict resolution and mediation
training for all US Foreign Service Officers (FSOs). The State Department's
geographic bureaus have traditionally been responsible for most of the diplomacy
of the United States, since they are on the ground in the countries of concern
and have extensive knowledge of the local situation. That S/CRS never assumed
a significant role in Afghanistan and Iraq can be attributed in part by the lack of
conflict resolution skills by FSOs.
FSOs are trained in how to exercise tools of diplomacy, sticks and carrots. They
are experts on how to create certain kinds of incentives and pressures to achieve
US foreign policy objectives. However, a different skill set and training for FSOs
is necessary in order to prepare diplomats to actually do the kind of intra-state
diplomacy that is needed in fragile and failed states. Furthermore, the protocols
for promotion should be changed so that a political officer must serve in a fragile
or conflict-affected area in order to get promoted.
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