(ACO) regulations - American Society of Anesthesiologists

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CMS-1345-P 334 must notify us of the change within 30 days and that the ACO must recalculate and report at that time their PSA shares for common services that two or more independent ACO participants provide to patients from the same PSA. We propose that if any revised PSA share is calculated to be greater than 50 percent, the ACO will be subject to mandatory review or re-review by the Antitrust Agencies in order to maintain the benefits of competition for Medicare beneficiaries and eligibility to participate in the Shared Savings Program. Finally, we propose that if the ACO fails to obtain a letter from the reviewing Antitrust Agency confirming that it has no present intent to challenge or recommend challenging the ACO, the ACO will be terminated from the Shared Savings Program. The purpose of requiring Antitrust Agency confirmation that it has no present intent to challenge or recommend challenging the ACO as a condition of participation is two-fold. First, the proposal ensures that ACOs participating in the Shared Savings Program will not present competitive problems that could subject them to antitrust challenge that may prevent them from completing the term of their 3-year agreement with us. Section 1899(b)(2)(B) of the Act provides that ACOs shall enter into an agreement with the Secretary to participate in the program for not less than a 3-year period. We believe the requirement that ACOs be willing and able to commit to a 3-year agreement to participate in the Shared Savings Program is necessary to ensure that the program achieves its long-term goal of redesigning health care processes, and our proposal here furthers that intent. Second, the proposal maintains competition for the benefit of Medicare beneficiaries by reducing the potential for the creation of ACOs with market power. As discussed in more detail later in the document, we believe that competition in the marketplace benefits Medicare and the Shared Savings Program because it promotes quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries and
CMS-1345-P 335 protects beneficiary access to a variety of providers. Furthermore, competition benefits the Shared Savings Program by allowing the opportunity for the formation of two or more ACOs in an area, which could accelerate advancements in quality and efficiency. All of these benefits to Medicare patients would be reduced or eliminated if we allow ACOs to participate in the Shared Savings Program when their participation would create market power. b. Competition and Quality of Care Because Medicare prices are regulated, ACOs participating in the Shared Savings Program will not compete on the basis of price. Nevertheless, economic theory and competition policy suggest that these ACOs will compete to serve Medicare beneficiaries on the basis of nonprice dimensions such as quality of care, innovations that improve care, and choice in treatment options. Empirical studies of the Medicare program confirm this theory and demonstrate that, where prices are fixed, competition among health care providers produces higher quality for consumers. 22 The most prominent study of markets with fixed prices examined the impact of market concentration on mortality for Medicare heart attack patients. The study found that mortality was significantly higher for patients in more concentrated markets. 23 A later study had similar findings in that high-risk Medicare patients' heart attack mortality was higher in highly concentrated markets, while there was no such effect for low-risk patients. 24 Overall, the evidence suggests that competition in the presence of regulated prices fosters improved quality. 22 See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful? 115 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECON. 577 (2000); Daniel P. Kessler & Jeffrey J. Geppert, The Effects of Competition on Variation in the Quality and Cost of Medical Care, 14 JOURNAL OF ECON. AND MGMT. STRATEGY 575 (2005). See also Abigail Tay Assessing Competition in Hospital Care Markets: The Importance of Accounting for Quality Differentiation 34 RAND JOURNAL OF ECON. 786 (2003). 23 Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful? 115 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECON., 577 (2000). 24 Daniel P. Kessler & Jeffrey J. Geppert, The Effects of Competition on Variation in the Quality and Cost of Medical Care 14 JOURNAL OF ECON. AND MGMT. STRATEGY, 575 (2005).
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV
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CMS-1345-P 3 Centers for Medicare &
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CMS-1345-P 5 C. Overview and Intent
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CMS-1345-P 7 7. Aligning ACO Qualit
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CMS-1345-P 9 CCNC Community Care of
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CMS-1345-P 11 SSN TIN Social Securi
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CMS-1345-P 13 better coordinate car
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CMS-1345-P 15 and efficient service
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CMS-1345-P 17 ACO shall have at lea
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CMS-1345-P 19 program or demonstrat
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CMS-1345-P 21 Section 1899(d)(3) of
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CMS-1345-P 23 Section 1899 (i) of t
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CMS-1345-P 25 • An ACO will manag
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CMS-1345-P 27 providers participati
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CMS-1345-P 29 The Affordable Care A
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CMS-1345-P 31 establish an estimate
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CMS-1345-P 33 personal physicians;
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CMS-1345-P 35 • Experience with n
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CMS-1345-P 37 when looking at the e
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CMS-1345-P 39 Medicare FFS benefici
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CMS-1345-P 41 by only those ACO par
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CMS-1345-P 43 Since the statute req
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CMS-1345-P 45 For FQHCs and RHCs, t
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CMS-1345-P 47 individual practition
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CMS-1345-P 49 additional Medicare e
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CMS-1345-P 51 The ACO's legal entit
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CMS-1345-P 53 We note that by propo
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CMS-1345-P 55 and administrative sy
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CMS-1345-P 57 governance would crea
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CMS-1345-P 59 demonstration, partic
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CMS-1345-P 61 We believe that these
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CMS-1345-P 63 • Clinical manageme
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CMS-1345-P 65 participants and ACO
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CMS-1345-P 67 Section 1899(b)(2)(A)
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CMS-1345-P 69 be subject to the req
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CMS-1345-P 71 program while still f
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CMS-1345-P 73 Thus, we considered w
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CMS-1345-P 75 addressing situations
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CMS-1345-P 77 include provisions fo
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CMS-1345-P 79 b. Processes to Promo
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CMS-1345-P 81 • Telehealth. • T
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CMS-1345-P 83 centeredness that is
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CMS-1345-P 85 mechanism for coordin
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CMS-1345-P 87 We are soliciting com
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CMS-1345-P 89 to ensure that survey
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CMS-1345-P 91 panel. Such a proposa
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CMS-1345-P 93 addressing disparitie
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CMS-1345-P 95 Individualized plans
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CMS-1345-P 97 beneficiaries by mini
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CMS-1345-P 99 a. Compliance Plans W
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CMS-1345-P 101 generated by ACO par
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CMS-1345-P 103 C. Establishing the
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CMS-1345-P 105 After evaluating the
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CMS-1345-P 107 when the final payme
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CMS-1345-P 109 performance of ACO p
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CMS-1345-P 111 cost-effectiveness o
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CMS-1345-P 113 they identify priori
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CMS-1345-P 115 generally bars the d
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CMS-1345-P 117 acting on behalf of
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CMS-1345-P 119 previous year's hist
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CMS-1345-P 121 providers/suppliers.
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CMS-1345-P 123 permitted under the
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CMS-1345-P 125 and the claim paymen
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CMS-1345-P 127 measurement activiti
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CMS-1345-P 129 beneficiary choice:
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CMS-1345-P 131 promote trust and pe
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CMS-1345-P 133 beneficiaries. We an
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CMS-1345-P 135 ensure that ACOs und
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CMS-1345-P 137 eligibility since th
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CMS-1345-P 139 or to providers or s
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CMS-1345-P 141 ACO and the eligibil
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CMS-1345-P 143 From a technical, op
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CMS-1345-P 145 beneficiaries would
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CMS-1345-P 147 associated with thos
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CMS-1345-P 149 pediatric medicine,"
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CMS-1345-P 151 care services" on th
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CMS-1345-P 153 better address the d
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CMS-1345-P 155 assignment from year
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CMS-1345-P 157 appropriate safeguar
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CMS-1345-P 159 ACO only when he or
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CMS-1345-P 161 We propose to implem
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CMS-1345-P 163 quality and shared s
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CMS-1345-P 165 chosen. We seek comm
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CMS-1345-P 167 measures to assess t
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CMS-1345-P 169 • To the extent pr
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CMS-1345-P 171 data collection and
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CMS-1345-P 173 improving ACO qualit
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CMS-1345-P 175 Domain Measure Title
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CMS-1345-P 187 43. At Risk Populati
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CMS-1345-P 189 50. At Risk Populati
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CMS-1345-P 195 Information on Physi
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CMS-1345-P 197 associated with clai
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CMS-1345-P 199 be required to popul
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CMS-1345-P 201 as that term is defi
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CMS-1345-P 203 Table 2: Five Measur
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CMS-1345-P 205 sided shared savings
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CMS-1345-P 207 Table 4: Total Point
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CMS-1345-P 209 Medicare program. Fu
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CMS-1345-P 211 for the first perfor
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CMS-1345-P 213 of quality acknowled
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CMS-1345-P 215 (Option 1) but using
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CMS-1345-P 217 ACO would qualify fo
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CMS-1345-P 219 future rulemaking. W
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CMS-1345-P 221 proposing greater al
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CMS-1345-P 223 6. Public Reporting
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CMS-1345-P 225 efficiency, effectiv
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CMS-1345-P 227 this information ava
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CMS-1345-P 229 Specifically, we see
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CMS-1345-P 231 We considered severa
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CMS-1345-P 233 Track 2: More experi
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CMS-1345-P 235 determinations about
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CMS-1345-P 237 beneficiaries during
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CMS-1345-P 239 truncate an assigned
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CMS-1345-P 241 the demonstration wh
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CMS-1345-P 243 We seek comments abo
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CMS-1345-P 245 Of these two methods
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CMS-1345-P 247 other factor could b
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CMS-1345-P 249 Capitation Rates, Pa
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CMS-1345-P 251 A model that uses be
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CMS-1345-P 253 option to audit ACOs
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CMS-1345-P 255 Thus, we are not pro
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CMS-1345-P 257 subsequently receive
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CMS-1345-P 259 This benchmark is su
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CMS-1345-P 261 nationwide under the
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CMS-1345-P 263 benchmark based on t
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CMS-1345-P 265 upon the number of M
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CMS-1345-P 267 beneficiaries. In re
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CMS-1345-P 269 and share in savings
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CMS-1345-P 271 a result of normal y
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CMS-1345-P 273 • 50 percent or mo
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CMS-1345-P 275 • Among older adul
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CMS-1345-P 277 of dual eligible ben
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CMS-1345-P 279 they incur shareable
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CMS-1345-P 281 for the Medicare pro
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Page 293 and 294: CMS-1345-P 293 Design Element Minim
Page 295 and 296: CMS-1345-P 295 performance) under t
Page 297 and 298: CMS-1345-P 297 For purposes of the
Page 299 and 300: CMS-1345-P 299 proposed that for th
Page 301 and 302: CMS-1345-P 301 For example, a two-s
Page 303 and 304: CMS-1345-P 303 depends on the ACO's
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Page 307 and 308: CMS-1345-P 307 the ACO's repayment
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Page 313 and 314: CMS-1345-P 313 requirements not set
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Page 321 and 322: CMS-1345-P 321 ● Failure to compl
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Page 327 and 328: CMS-1345-P 327 Shared Savings Progr
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Page 331 and 332: CMS-1345-P 331 The Antitrust Policy
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Page 337 and 338: CMS-1345-P 337 both Medicare benefi
Page 339 and 340: CMS-1345-P 339 J. Overlap with Othe
Page 341 and 342: CMS-1345-P 341 CMS shared savings p
Page 343 and 344: CMS-1345-P 343 Shared Savings Progr
Page 345 and 346: CMS-1345-P 345 improve the Shared S
Page 347 and 348: CMS-1345-P 347 V. Regulatory Impact
Page 349 and 350: CMS-1345-P 349 The Shared Savings P
Page 351 and 352: CMS-1345-P 351 ACOs work to improve
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Page 355 and 356: CMS-1345-P 355 • Number of partic
Page 357 and 358: CMS-1345-P 357 distribution. With t
Page 359 and 360: CMS-1345-P 359 c. Further Considera
Page 361 and 362: CMS-1345-P 361 More specifically, w
Page 363 and 364: CMS-1345-P 363 program and uncertai
Page 365 and 366: CMS-1345-P 365 Savings Program at 7
Page 367 and 368: CMS-1345-P 367 ACO-attributed claim
Page 369 and 370: CMS-1345-P 369 Category Costs COSTS
Page 371 and 372: CMS-1345-P 371 For the reasons set
Page 373 and 374: CMS-1345-P 373 (2) Program requirem
Page 375 and 376: CMS-1345-P 375 Act. Hospital means
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Page 379 and 380: CMS-1345-P 379 (C) Begin to operate
Page 381 and 382: CMS-1345-P 381 (D) The civil moneta
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CMS-1345-P 385 for populations, and
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CMS-1345-P 387 monitoring and evalu
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CMS-1345-P 389 (i) It plans to use
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CMS-1345-P 391 (1) Have a beneficia
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CMS-1345-P 393 who were an ACO part
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CMS-1345-P 395 amount for the patie
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CMS-1345-P 397 under §425.7(b). An
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CMS-1345-P 399 (ii) To be responsib
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CMS-1345-P 401 §425.8 ACO quality
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CMS-1345-P 403 (2) CMS scores indiv
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CMS-1345-P 405 (a) Monitoring of AC
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CMS-1345-P 407 required measure dat
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CMS-1345-P 409 (5) The procedures e
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CMS-1345-P 411 demonstrate in its a
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CMS-1345-P 413 days of the notice o
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CMS-1345-P 415 original notice of d
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CMS-1345-P 417 (c) Notwithstanding
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CMS-1345-P 419 (ii) Quality perform
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CMS-1345-P 421 (i) The beneficiary
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CMS-1345-P 423 terminated from the
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CMS-1345-P 425 inclusion of additio
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CMS-1345-P 427 individuals, better
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CMS-1345-P 04/07/2011] [FR Doc. 201
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(ACO) regulations - American Society of Anesthesiologists

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