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(ACO) regulations - American Society of Anesthesiologists

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CMS-1345-P 353<br />

presumably provide a weaker incentive to <strong>ACO</strong>s than other possible approaches. The optional<br />

two-sided risk model, and the requirement for all other <strong>ACO</strong>s to accept downside risk in their<br />

third program year, both provide stronger incentives than a shared savings only approach. For<br />

example, under the one-sided model, a provider's worst-case outcome is the failure to earn<br />

shared-savings. A provider would operate under the significant possibility that there would be<br />

no impact on their Medicare reimbursement. The two-sided risk model, however, presents<br />

liability for excessive expenditures, significantly increasing a provider's perceived likelihood that<br />

aggregate Medicare revenue will depend on the level <strong>of</strong> efficiency with which they operate. In<br />

addition, the two-sided model <strong>of</strong>fers a lower minimum savings rate and a greater sharing<br />

percentage, both <strong>of</strong> which enhance the incentive for efficiency. However, participating <strong>ACO</strong>s<br />

may be more likely to choose the one-sided model for the first 2 years and thereby avoid the<br />

potential for financial loss if expenditures experience a significant upward fluctuation or if<br />

efficiency improvements are less effective than planned.<br />

In the third year <strong>of</strong> their first agreement period, as noted previously, all <strong>ACO</strong>s that<br />

participate in the one-sided model during the first 2 years <strong>of</strong> the agreement period will be<br />

required to transition to the two-sided risk model. We believe certain participating <strong>ACO</strong>s may<br />

choose to terminate their agreement early after the first 2 years. For example, <strong>ACO</strong>s in Track 1<br />

that failed to meet the expenditure growth targets in the first 2 years (but were protected from<br />

penalties by being in the one-sided model), would likely reconsider their continuing<br />

participation. Certain other <strong>ACO</strong>s, such as those in higher-cost areas <strong>of</strong> the country, could also<br />

terminate their agreement if they anticipate that the national growth formula, relative to their<br />

local baseline cost, puts them in jeopardy <strong>of</strong> experiencing losses in the third year. (Under section<br />

2899(d) <strong>of</strong> the Act, we update <strong>ACO</strong> benchmarks by the estimated annual increase in the absolute

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