G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive

This, of course, is exactly what happened, but General Wedemeyer's report was, at
Secretary of State George Marshall's insistence, suppressed and denied to both Congress
and the public.
After we had withdrawn most of our troops in accordance with a United Nations resolution,
our Army general headquarters in South Korea began sending repeated and urgent
reports to Washington warning that there was an unmistakable military buildup just above
the 38th Parallel. One such report even contained the date of the expected North Korean
attack. 3 In spite of these reports, however, and despite the fact that money had been
appropriated by Congress for the purpose of building up South Korea's defenses,
officialdom somehow managed to stall and delay for over three months so that no military
equipment--not even ammunition--was delivered to reinforce South Korea. 4 Yet, when the
attack finally came Washington officials pretended to be surprised and taken off guard.
One thing is certain: if we knew that the Communists were preparing for over a year to
attack South Korea, the Communists knew it too! That may seem too obvious to mention,
yet nine out of ten Americans have never considered the possibility that the Communists
wanted the United Nations to commit the U.S. to fight in Korea. If the Communists had not
wanted the Korean War, they would not have started it. And if they had not wanted the UN
to go through the motions of trying to oppose them, they would have vetoed the action in
the Security Council. As part of the show, however, the Soviet delegation had stagemanaged
an impressive walkout supposedly in protest over the defeat of a motion to seat
Red China. Consequently, when the attack came, the Soviets supposedly outsmarted
themselves by not being on hand to administer the veto. But, as we have just stated, the
assumption that the Communists did not know well in advance that the whole thing was
coming is absurd. They planned it! The fact that they were conveniently absent when the
issue came before the UN only shows that they needed a surface excuse to refrain from
the veto.
The actual course of the war is well known by all. Our tiny occupational force had been
deliberately kept unprepared for the sudden massive assault. It was overwhelmed, backed
into the Pusan pocket, and hovered on the brink of being pushed into the sea. There is no
doubt that the Communists fully expected to sweep us off the peninsula with hardly any
opposition, which would have been quite a prestige-builder for them around the world.
They would have done it, too, if it had not been for the independent Americanism of
General MacArthur and the bravery of his troops. As MacArthur, himself, recalled: "The
only predictions from Washington at that time warned of impending military disaster. Then,
too, our ammunition was critically short. . . . General [Walton] Walker, at one stage, was
down to five rounds per gun. His heroically successful efforts under unparalleled
shortages of all sorts constituted an amazing military exploit." 5
Hopelessly outnumbered by the enemy, General MacArthur conceived one of the most
brilliant maneuvers in military history: the Inchon landing. It was a daring surprise flank
attack aimed at cutting off the North Korean supply lines. It worked beautifully and, as a
result, the enemy forces disintegrated and were nearly destroyed. As General MacArthur
stated:
By the latter part of October, the capitol of Pyongyang was captured.
These events completely transformed the situation from pessimism to
optimism. This was the golden moment to translate military victory to a
politically advantageous peace. Success in war involves military as well
as political considerations. For the sacrifice leading to a military victory