G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive

They make desolation which they call peace.
Tacitus (54-119 A.D.)
CHAPTER SIX: AH, PEACE
The defeat of the United Nations in Katanga was met with anguished cries from the world
Communist press. Tass, the Soviet news agency, said that the cease-fire agreement with
"colonialist puppet Tshombe" evoked only a feeling of "indignation." The Tass writer, V.
Kharokov, complained that what had been a promising UN operation to end Katanga's
secession had turned out to be "a total flop." 1
The Communists, however, were unduly concerned, for the UN was not giving up yet. It
was using the cease-fire merely as a means of building up its strength for a renewed
attack. Immediately, additional troops began to arrive on the scene: The first four of
fourteen UN jets landed at Leopoldville. The buildup was both extensive and rapid. Finally,
on November 24, 1961, the Security Council swung into action once again. It passed
another resolution strongly condemning Katanga for its continued use of mercenaries and
then authorized the further use of force to bring it under the control of the central
government. The velvet glove was now completely off. This amounted to a declaration of
war against Katanga. Tshombe was quick to realize this and, addressing a crowd of eight
thousand cheering Africans two days later, he said that the United Nations would soon
"undertake war on our territory. . . . Tomorrow or the day after, there will be a trial of
strength. Let us prepare for it. Let Katanga fighters arise at the given moment in every
street, every lane, every road and every village. I will give you the signal at the opportune
time." 2
Minister of the Interior Munongo later echoed Tshombe's sentiment when he proclaimed:
"We are all here, resolved to fight and die if necessary. The UN may take our cities. There
will remain our villages and the bush. All the tribal chiefs are alerted. We are savages; we
are Negroes. So be it! We shall fight like savages with our arrows." 3
While the UN military buildup was taking place, troops of the central government began to
move into position to invade the regions of northern Katanga. Since this would be civil
war, and since the UN said it was in the Congo to prevent civil war, one might expect the
peace-keepers to do something about it. They did. They provided large quantities of
supplies and helped transport the central government troops into Katanga. The UN
referred to this as a "police action." The chief UN representative in the Congo, Sture
Linner, further explained that any move on the part of Tshombe to secure his defensive
military position along Katanga's borders would be considered an act of civil war and that
the UN would take action to prevent it. 4
The central government was getting impatient to nail Tshombe's hide to the wall. Justin
Bomboko, the Congolese foreign minister who had previously brought charges of high
treason against Tshombe, later revealed the prevailing mood of his government when he
said: "Tshombe only understands the language of force and pressure. . . . We can
negotiate for 100 years with Tshombe, but it will be in vain. There is no hope of solving
this problem by peaceful means. We lose our time, and this is the reason why we went to
the UN and Washington." 5