G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive

lind "killing and wounding--even in the hospitals." He stated that since the United States
had continued to finance and support this carnage he was returning with disgust the
Medal of Freedom awarded to him by the United States in 1946. 17
That same day, December 14, a full-page advertisement was run in the New York Times
protesting the bombing of Katanga, which had "committed no aggression except wanting
to be free of a Communist-controlled central government." The State Department replied
by accusing the sponsors of the ad of taking bribes from the Katanga Information Service
in New York. 18 Adlai Stevenson said further: "The object of the United States in supporting
the United Nations during this long and trying period has been to advance American policy
in Africa. . . . It seems to me that our policy and UN policy have coincided exactly in the
Congo. I wish many Americans would think of that when they complain about what has
been done there." 19
And so it went. The great and powerful United Nations--the "last best hope for peace," the
"moral conscience of the world"--pitted against tiny Katanga, a country that would not give
up. Again and again, Katanga held firm. Finally another cease-fire was called.
Almost a year went by while the United Nations went through the motions of conciliation
and pondered its next move. Matters were complicated by the Congo war lasting longer
and costing far more than expected. It put the United Nations into debt. A further financial
complication arose when Soviet Russia refused to pay its share of the cost. This, of
course, made it appear as if the Communists were really quite unhappy over the UN
Congo policy. They knew full well, however, that their friends in Washington would put up
enough "dirty capitalist" money to cover the whole operation. They were right, as was
proved by subsequent events.
The American taxpayer was simply told that the Congo operation was anti-Communist
while he was being relieved of several hundred million more dollars. 20
On October 12, 1962, the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters
revealed a highly confidential memorandum which had been circulated among top United
Nations officials. The memorandum put forth a very precise and intricate timetable for
renewed military aggression against Katanga. It also predicted that the United States
would go along with these plans in spite of rising public opposition at the grass roots. It
declared:
The U.S. will judge itself bound, as in the past, by UN decisions and will
supply the necessary transport aircraft and, later on, helicopters. . . .
Washington would like to work out a compromise; but the State
Department has based its policy on the UN and will in no circumstances
disregard its obligations to the UN decision.
United Nations officials and State Department spokesmen immediately charged that the
memorandum was fictitious. Events since then, however, have proved that it was one
hundred percent accurate, even to the timetable.
Suddenly, the UN released a press report describing a letter said to have been signed by
eight important tribal chiefs in Katanga. The letter branded Tshombe as a traitor, asked for
his immediate arrest, demanded that troops be sent to crush Tshombe's resistance, and
highly praised the United Nations. While most newsmen took the report at face value,
Michael Padev of the daily Arizona Republic thought that the whole matter seemed too