G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive

einforce the false image that our greatest danger is from outside military attack rather
than from internal subversion? Or was it primarily a propaganda weapon for the Soviets to
use showing that the United States is now so fearful of the military superiority of
Communism that it was willing to travel to Moscow and sign a treaty which was clearly to
its military disadvantage?
All of these purposes played a part, of course, but the most important feature of the entire
treaty was one which received practically no public attention or concern. Buried deep
within the terminology of the treaty was a phrase that took disarmament out of the
proposal stage and put it in the commitment stage. When the Senate ratified the treaty it
created a "supreme law of the land" which now binds the U.S., in the words of the treaty
itself, to "the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete
disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the
United Nations."
The true significance of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, therefore, was simply to take us one
more very important step closer to the ultimate transfer of our nuclear weapons to the
United Nations. The first step was our formal proposal to the UN in 1961. The second was
the passing of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, which made it legally possible. The
third step, the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, has committed us to carry out the plan. All that is
now left is to do it. Nothing else stands in the way. Without consulting Congress or the
Senate, the President and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency can surrender our
weapons whenever they wish.
And so, on September 20, 1963, President Kennedy addressed the UN and said:
Two years ago, I told this body that the United States had proposed and
was willing to sign a limited test ban treaty. Today that treaty has been
signed. It will not put an end to war. It will not remove basic conflicts. It
will not secure freedom for all. But it can be a lever. As Archimedes, in
explaining the principle of the lever, was said to have declared to his
friends: "Give me a place where I can stand-- and I shall move the
world." 24
Exactly four months later, on January 21, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson spoke over
nationwide radio and television and, parroting the sentiments of his predecessor, said:
This morning in Geneva, Switzerland, the eighteen nation committee on
disarmament resumed its work. There is only one item on the agenda
today of that conference. It is the leading item on the agenda of all
mankind, and that one item is peace. . . .We now have a limited nuclear
test ban treaty. We now have an emergency communications link, a
"hot-line" between Washington and Moscow. We now have an
agreement in the United Nations to keep bombs out of outer space.
These are small steps, but they go in the right direction, the direction of
security and sanity and peace. Now we must go further. . . . The best
way to begin disarming is to begin. And we shall hear any plan, go any
place, make any plea, and play any part that offers a realistic prospect
for peace. 25