G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive
G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive
G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive
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Subversion in Government Departments. 19 It adds up to a clear pattern of deliberate<br />
Communist penetration into key positions within our own government and the use of these<br />
positions to generate a Communist-inspired United States foreign policy. <strong>The</strong> major<br />
feature of this policy has centered around getting the United States to gradually give up its<br />
independence to the authority and control of the United Nations, which was created by the<br />
Communists for just this purpose. As security officer J. Anthony Panuch summarized it:<br />
It was World War II which gave the Soviet plan its impetus. During this<br />
period, a massive infiltration of sensitive agencies of the government<br />
took place. Pro-Communist and personnel of subversive and<br />
revolutionary tendencies were able to establish themselves in strategic<br />
slots . . . to shift the center of gravity in the process of U.S. foreign<br />
policy from a national to an international orientation via the supranational<br />
UN organization. Furthermore, if working control of the U.S.<br />
foreign policy were focalized in the UN organization, the role of<br />
Congress in our foreign affairs could be bypassed. 20<br />
Postwar foreign policy planning and the San Francisco conference of 1945 seem so far in<br />
the past that it is difficult for many to find a correlation between then and now. Yet events<br />
in Katanga were shaped as much by these now forgotten hands as they were by the<br />
O'Brien's and the Hammarskjold's of more recent memory. Needless to say, however,<br />
1945 was just the beginning. When it came time to begin the actual hiring of the UN<br />
administrative staff, secret American Communists were among the first in line.<br />
Trygve Lie, the United Nations' first secretary-general, said that in the first year members<br />
of the Secretariat had to be recruited very rapidly; about three thousand were hired<br />
between March and December of 1946 and hundreds more were hired in 1947. Lie was<br />
well aware of the possibility of their being secret Communists among the American job<br />
applicants, but this caused him little concern. As he put it: "Nothing in the Charter or in the<br />
staff regulations bars a Communist from being a member of the UN Secretariat; nor could<br />
there be in an organization that embraces both Communist and non-Communist<br />
members." 21<br />
This is, of course, one of the reasons why the United Nations can never work to promote<br />
freedom, justice or anything else the Communists wish to suppress. But that is another<br />
subject and one with which we shall deal at some length further along. For now, the<br />
important point is that the immediate demand for thousands of people to fill out the United<br />
Nations' original staff provided a golden opportunity for the agents of Communism to get in<br />
on the ground floor and to swarm into the key positions. <strong>The</strong> record shows that this is<br />
precisely what they did.<br />
Since the new world-government organization needed men and women with skills and<br />
experience similar to those acquired in the service of national government agencies, it<br />
was only natural that most of the original applicants were people who had been working<br />
for the United States Government in one capacity or another. It was natural, too, that<br />
these people should have the approval or recommendation of their former employer.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are two kinds of recommendations, however: official and unofficial. An official<br />
recommendation would naturally be entered into the record and might contain, among<br />
other things, a security check. An unofficial recommendation would have no such<br />
drawbacks; a simple telephone call from an influential person in the State Department is<br />
all that would be required.