G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive

delegation upon hearing of my withdrawal and, as a result of the
meeting, the Americans had agreed to revert to their original support of
my candidacy. The Soviet Union would nominate me, he added, and the
Americans would vote for me. . . .
Mr. Gromyko strode to the rostrum and declared:
"Weighing the candidatures which have recently been mentioned in
connection with the election of the president the Soviet delegation has
come to the conclusion that the most appropriate candidature would be
that of the foreign minister of Norway, Mr. Trygve Lie." . . .
Wincenty Rzymowski of Poland then rose in dutiful support of the
nomination, and spoke of Norway and of me in generous terms. He was
followed by Dimitri Manuilsky, the "old Bolshevik" from pre-Stalin days
who was then foreign minister of the Ukrainian SSR. . . .
Spaak won the election by just three votes, but, as Lie reminisced: "There is no doubt that
the results of that election were felt long after, and clearly influenced the subsequent
election of the secretary-general." 11
The post of secretary-general is infinitely more important than that of president of the
assembly. So when the time came to fill this post, Washington and Moscow once again
moved in unison. Lie wrote:
I recall something that Andrei Vyshinsky said in the course of a
conversation in London just before my election as Secretary-General. It
was a most friendly talk in which Vyshinsky said that both the Soviet
Union and the United States warmly advocated my nomination, and that
Mr. Bevin [of Great Britain] could be "brought around." 12
As mentioned previously, Trygve Lie was outspoken in his advocacy of the admission of
Red China to the United Nations. He had even taken the initiative in trying to drum up
sufficient votes to make this possible. He further took the stand that Chiang Kai-shek
should be ousted from Formosa. 13
It is no wonder, then, that the Communists were well pleased at having such a "non-
Communist" at the head of the United Nations. But Americans were led to believe just the
opposite. During, the Korean War, for instance, the Soviet delegation put on an impressive
performance of pouting in public, supposedly over the way in which Lie was standing firm
against their aggression. It was corny acting but good enough to fool the American public--
which is all it was intended to do. How the Communists really felt about Trygve Lie is best
revealed by Lie himself. When Lie first threatened to resign as secretary-general (be
threatened to do so on several occasions), he went to discuss the matter with his good
friend Gromyko.
. . . I went to see Mr. Gromyko. . . . I announced the feeling that I should
resign in protest at the American shift of position, and I have never
found Ambassador Gromyko more friendly. His melancholy features fit
up with sympathy. But he seemed half alarmed at my idea. "Speaking
for myself," he said, "I hope you will not resign, and I advise you against
it. What good will it do? How will it change American policy? In any